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Costs of Change, Political Polarization, and Re-election Hurdles

Gersbach, Hans; Muller, Philippe; Tejada, Oriol - 2015

We develop and study a two-period model of political competition with office- and policymotivated candidates, in which (i) changes of policies impose costs on all individuals and (ii) such costs increase with the magnitude of the policy change. We show that there is an optimal positive level of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753286

Vote-Share Contracts and Learning-by-Doing

Müller, Markus - 2009

We examine the interaction between vote-share contracts and learning-by-doing. Candidates for a political office are allowed to offer vote-share thresholds. The elected politician has to achieve at least this threshold value in his reelection result to remain in office for a second term. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753178

Unraveling Short- and Farsightedness in Politics

Gersbach, Hans; Ponta, Oriana - 2012

The absence of the deselection threat in incumbents’ last term in office can be negative or positive for society. Some politicians may reduce their efforts, while others may pursue beneficial long-term policies that may be unpopular in the short term. We propose a novel pension system that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753222

Institutional change in search of the market: The case of Slovenia

Glismann, Hans H.; Horn, Ernst-Jürgen; Stanovnik, Peter - 1995

Six main characteristics of an economic order are discussed and empirically evaluated for the case of Slovenia. All of them pertain to the institutional setting ab urbe condita; they comprise the legal and jurisdictional situation, the role of private property, the institutionalised strive at...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010275197

Tax Contracts and Elections

Gersbach, Hans; Schneider, Maik T. - 2009

In this paper we examine the impact of tax contracts as a novel institution on elections, policies, and welfare. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753187

Coalition-Preclusion Contracts and Moderate Policies

Gersbach, Hans; Schneider, Maik T.; Tejada, Oriol - 2014

We examine the effects of a novel political institution, which we call Coalition- Preclusion Contracts, on elections …, policies, and welfare. Coalition-Preclusion Contracts enable political parties to credibly commit before the elections not to … form a coalition after the elections with one or several other parties specified in the contract. We consider a political …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753259

Policy reforms and the amount of checks & balances

Gersbach, Hans; Tejada, Oriol; Wagner, Julia - 2022

We examine how democracies choose their amount of checks and balances (C&B). For this purpose, we consider a simple model of political competition with costly policy reforms. The cost of a marginal reform is determined endogenously at the constitutional phase-i.e. before policies are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013346919

Participatory accountability and collective action: Experimental evidence from Albania

Barr, Abigail; Packard, Truman; Serra, Danila - 2013

institutions and national elections, both at the individual level and the district level. These correlations are robust to the … introduction of many controls in the analysis and, in the case of national elections, to the use of official election turn …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010392435

It's the media, stupid: how media activity shapes public spending

Bruns, Christian; Himmler, Oliver - 2008

Politicians seeking reelection need voters to know what they have done for them. Thus, incentives may arise to spend more money where media coverage is higher. We present a simple model to explain the allocation of public spending across jurisdictions contingent on media activity. An incumbent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264514

Does Campaign Finance imply Political Favors?

Claessens, Stijn; Feijen, Erik; Laeven, Luc - 2006

This paper provides empirical evidence that campaign contributions arestrongly associated with market expectations of future firm-specific political favors,including preferential access to external financing. Using a novel dataset, we find thatfirms in Brazil providing contributions in the 1998...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325391