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Competing on the Holodeck: The Effect of Virtual Peers and Heterogeneity in Dynamic Tournaments

Graff, Frederik; Grund, Christian; Harbring, Christine - 2018

tournament in VR, we are able to mitigate the reflection problem, which usually undermines research on dynamic interaction … output. We observe that the subjects' performance is highest in a homogeneous tournament, i.e., when they compete against an … peer effects rather than by tournament incentives. We extensively track the behavior of subjects and the particular …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011984479

Reward or Punishment? The Distribution of Life-Cycle Returns to Political Office

Dahlgaard, Jens Olav; Kristensen, Nicolai; Larsen, … - 2022

How political office is remunerated will affect who decides to engage in politics. Even if average returns to office are positive, as unilaterally found in the literature, some office holders' returns are likely zero or negative. The timing of returns to office are crucial too, as politicians...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013351813

?Atypical Work? and Compensation

Addison, John T.; Surfield, Christopher J. - 2005

Atypical work, or alternative work arrangements in U.S. parlance, has long been criticized for providing poorly-compensated employment. Although one group of atypical workers (contractors) seems to enjoy a wage premium, our cross-section results from the CPS and NLSY for the better-known...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262200

How Late to Pay? Understanding Wage Arrears in Russia

Earle, John S.; Sabirianova, Klara Z. - 2002

We organize an empirical analysis of Russian wage arrears around hypotheses concerning factors that create incentives for firms to pay late and for workers to tolerate late payment, both reinforced by a prevalent environment of overdue wages. Our analysis draws upon nationally representative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011763240

Feedback and incentives: experimental evidence

Eriksson, Tor; Poulsen, Anders; Villeval, Marie-Claire - 2008

-takes-all tournament. We find that, regardless of the pay scheme used, feedback does not improve performance. There are no significant peer … effects in the piece-rate pay scheme. In contrast, in the tournament scheme we find some evidence of positive peer effects …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268675

Strive to be first or avoid being last: An experiment on relative performance incentives.

Dutcher, E. Glenn; Balafoutas, Loukas; Lindner, Florian; … - 2013

Managers often use tournaments which motivate workers to compete for the top, compete to avoid the bottom, or both. In this paper we compare the effectiveness and efficiency of the corresponding incentive schemes. To do so, we utilize optimal contracts in a principal-agent setting, using a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312236

Potential, prizes and performance : testing tournament theory with professional tennis data

Sunde, Uwe - 2003

This paper tests two hypotheses from the theory of elimination tournaments: (i) that uneven tournaments, where the contestants are ex ante heterogeneous, entail lower effort exertion; this is a prediction from agency theory that has not been tested empirically before; and (ii) whether incentives...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261647

Incentives in Tournaments with Endogenous Prize Selection

Harbring, Christine; Irlenbusch, Bernd - 2004

Tournament incentive schemes offer payments dependent on relative performance and thereby are intended to motivate …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262080

Sabotage in Asymmetric Contests – An Experimental Analysis

Kräkel, Matthias; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Harbring, Christine; … - 2004

In a contest players compete for winning a prize by effort and thereby increasing their probability of winning. Contestants, however, could also improve their own relative position by harming the other players. We experimentally analyze contests with heterogeneous agents who may individually...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263109

On the incentive effects of uncertainty in monitoring agents: a theoretical and experimental analysis

Avrahami, Judith; Güth, Werner; Kareev, Yaakov; Uske, … - 2007

When two or more agents compete for a bonus and the agents' productivity in each of several possible occurrences depends stochastically on (constant) effort, the number of times that are checked to assign the bonus affects the level of un-certainty in the selection process. Uncertainty, in turn,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263840