evolutionary forces in games played repeatedly in large populations of boundedly rational agents. The approach is macro oriented in …

Applying unawareness belief structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2012), we develop Bayesian games … higher awareness levels and restricted from higher to lower awareness levels. We apply Bayesian games with unawareness to … relationship between standard Bayesian games and Bayesian games with unawareness. …

We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where players not only choose strategies but also choose … players in different roles, among other things. We also examine finite repetitions of games where players may choose to … rematch in any period. Some equilibria of fixed-player repeated games cannot be sustained as equilibria in a repeated social …

The theory of games against nature relies on complete preferences among all conceivable acts (case 1). Aumann and Drèze …

Nash equilibrium is shown to exist for every game. In symmetric bimatrix games, our results imply the existence of a …

actions in games, based on a structural econo- metric model of non-equilibrium behavior in games. The model is based pri …-player guessing games. The application illustrates the empirical relevance of the main features of the model. …

toward the anchor in games where choices are strategic substitutes. …

We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule 'imitate-if-better' can hardly be … game or a quasiconcave game. Our results apply to many interesting examples of symmetric games including 2 x 2 games …, Cournot duopoly, price competition, public goods games, common pool resource games, and minimum effort coordination games. …