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Umkämpfte Gruppenarbeit. Eine sekundäranalytische Auswertung von SOFI-Betriebsfallstudien bei Endherstellern in der Autoindustrie

Birke, Peter - In: Industrielle Beziehungen 26 (2019) 3, pp. 302‒325

Autoindustrie. Seine Grundlage sind Studien des Soziologischen Forschungsinstituts Göttingen zur Einführung von Gruppenarbeit, die … zwischen Anfang der 1990er und Mitte der 2000er Jahre durchgeführt wurden. Dort war die Annahme, Gruppenarbeit könne zu einer … the Sociological Research Institute Göttingen, the research studies the introduction of teamwork (Gruppenarbeit) in three …

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10012669265

Digital Facilitation of Group Work to Gain Predictable Performance

Gimpel, Henner; Lahmer, Stefanie; Wöhl, Moritz; … - In: Group Decision and Negotiation 33 (2023) 1, pp. 113-145

Group work is a commonly used method of working, and the performance of a group can vary depending on the type and structure of the task at hand. Research suggests that groups can exhibit "collective intelligence"—the ability to perform well across tasks—under certain conditions, making...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015271508

The Fragile Success of Team Start-ups

Stam, Erik; Schutjens, Veronique - 2005

This article describes the benefits and pitfalls of starting a firm with an entrepreneurial team, drawing on a longitudinal empirical analysis of the life course of 90 team start-ups and 1196 solo start-ups in the Netherlands. In the first three years of their existence, team start-ups perform...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010261510

Black Sheep and Walls of Silence

Roider, Andreas; Muehlheusser, Gerd - 2004

In this paper we analyze the frequently observed phenomenon that (i) some members of a team ("black sheep") exhibit behavior disliked by other (honest) team members, who (ii) nevertheless refrain from reporting such misbehavior to the authorities (they set up a "wall of silence"). Much cited...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010261919

Black Sheep and Walls of Silence

Mühlheußer, Gerd; Roider, Andreas - 2005

In this paper we analyze the frequently observed phenomenon that (i) some members of a team (“black sheep”) exhibit behavior disliked by other (honest) team members, who (ii) nevertheless refrain from reporting such misbehavior to the authorities (they set up a “wall of silence”). Much...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010263140

The rise of individual performance pay

Kvaloy, Ola; Olsen, Trond - 2007

Why does individual performance pay seem to prevail in human capital intensive industries? We present a model that may explain this. In a repeated game model of relational contracting, we analyze the conditions for implementing peer dependent incentive regimes when agents possess indispensable...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010264248

Social interaction, co-Worker altruism, and incentives

Dur, Robert; Sol, Joeri - 2008

Social interaction with colleagues is an important job attribute for many workers. To attract and retain workers, managers therefore need to think about how to create and preserve high-quality co-worker relationships. This paper develops a principal-multi-agent model where agents do not only...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010264500

Optimal monetary policy committee size: theory and cross country evidence

Erhart, Szilárd; Vasquez-Paz, Jose Luis - 2007

Theoretical and empirical studies of different sciences suggest that an optimal committee consists of roughly 5-9 members, although it can swell mildly under specific circumstances. This paper develops a conceptual model in order to analyze the issue in case of monetary policy formulation. The...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010264892

Positive and Negative Team Identity in a Promotion Game

Eberlein, Marion; Walkowitz, Gari - 2008

In this paper we experimentally investigate whether the so-called in-group/out-group bias leads to a favoring of own team members as candidates in promotion (by voting for them) relative to other teams and their members. In contrast to psychological approaches, mon- etary incentives for voting...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010264923

Voluntary teaming and effort

Keser, Claudia; Montmarquette, Claude - 2007

In a series of experimental games, each of two players may choose between remuneration based on either private or team effort. Although at least one of the players has the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy to choose remuneration based on private effort, we frequently observe team remuneration...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010264983