Lacking payment systems become a bottleneck for the vision of the Information Economy. In many cases payments of fractions of a cent, so-called micropayments, are of particular interest. In this paper we propose a framework to evaluate payment systems. The framework consists of a well structured...

This paper provides a characterization of dominant strategy mechanisms with quasi-linear utilities and multi-dimensional types for a variety of preference domains. These characterizations are in terms of a monotonicity property on the underlying allocation rule.

The property of an allocation rule to be implementable in dominant strategies by a unique payment scheme is called revenue equivalence. In this paper we give a characterization of revenue equivalence based on a graph theoretic interpretation of the incentive compatibility constraints. The...

With a laboratory experiment, we study the impact of buy-options and the corresponding buy-price on revenues and bidding behavior in (online) proxy-auctions with independent private valuations. We show that temporary buy-options may reduce revenues for two reasons: At low buy-prices, the...

The Shapley-Ichiishi result states that a game is convex if and only if the convex hull of marginal vectors equals the core. In this paper we generalize this result by distinguishing equivalence classes of balanced games that share the same core structure. We then associate a system of linear...

In a standard general equilibrium model it is assumed that there are no price restictionsand that prices adjust infinitely fast to their equilibrium values. In this paper the set ofadmissible prices is allowed to be an arbitrary convex set. For such an arbitrary set it cannotbe guaranteed that...

Many economic and social situations can be represented by a digraph. Both axiomatic and iterativemethods to determine the strength or power of all the nodes in a digraph have been proposed inthe literature. We propose a new method, where the power of a node is determined by both thenumber of its...

In this paper we study cooperative games with limited cooperation possibilities, represented by an undirected cycle-free communication graph. Players in the game can cooperate if and only if they are connected in the graph, i.e. they can communicate with one another. We introduce a new...

We consider cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), in which we allow for a social structure on the set of players. The social structure is utilized to refine the core of the game. For every coalition the relative strength of a player within that coalition is induced by the...

We study cooperative games with communication structure, represented by an undirected graph. Players in the game are able to cooperate only if they can form a network in the graph. A single-valued solution, the average tree solution, is proposed for this class of games. Given the graph structure...