Can enrolment incentives reduce the incidence of cream-skimming in the delivery of public sector services (e.g. education, health, job training)? In the context of a large government job training program, we investigate whether the use of enrolment incentives that set different 'shadow prices'...

We model the sorting of medical students across medical occupations and identify a mechanism that explains the possibility of differential productivity across occupations. The model combines moral hazard and matching of physicians and occupations with pre-matching investments. In equilibrium...

The compensation of a professor who is awarded an internal Canada Research Chair (CRC) increases by 6.3 percent on average in our sample. This gain is large initially but quickly erodes over CRC tenure. The gain is slightly larger for professors who change university to obtain a CRC Chair....

We examine economic mobility in India while accounting for misclassification to better understand the welfare e§ects of the rise in inequality. To proceed, we extend recently developed methods on the partial identification of transition matrices. Allowing for modest misclassification, we find...

The economic mobility of individuals and households is of fundamental interest. While many measures of economic mobility exist, reliance on transition matrices remains pervasive due to simplicity and ease of interpretation. However, estimation of transition matrices is complicated by the...

We examine economic mobility in India while rigorously accounting for measurement error. Such an analysis is imperative to fully understand the welfare effects of the rise in inequality that has occurred in India over the past few decades. To proceed, we extend recently developed methods on the...

This paper considers a model of a rating agency with multiple clients, in which each client has a separate market that forms a belief about the quality of the client after the agency issues a rating. When the clients are rated separately (individual rating), the credibility of a good rating in...

Costly delay in negotiations can induce the negotiating parties to be more forthcoming with their information and improve the quality of the collective decision. Imposing a deadline may result in stalling, in which players at some point stop making concessions but switch back to conceding at the...

This paper provides evidence to show that in the presence of imperfect formal institutions there is both a substitutional and a complementary relationship between accounting information and reputation, an informal institution. Empirical results using a sample of family firms listed in the...