We define the logit dynamic for games with continuous strategy spaces and establish its fundamental properties, i.e. the existence, uniqueness and continuity of solutions. We apply the dynamic to the analysis of the Burdett and Judd (1983) model of price dispersion. Our objective is to assess...

We introduce a class of evolutionary game dynamics - pairwise comparison dynamics - under which revising agents choose a candidate strategy at random, switching to it with positive probability if and only if its payoff is higher than the agent's current strategy. We prove that all such dynamics...

We study population game dynamics under which each revising agent tests each of his strategies a fixed number of times, with each play of each strategy being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the strategy whose total payoff was highest. In the Centipede game, these best experienced...

This paper compares two decision rules available to myopic players who are repeatedly randomly matched to play a 2 x 2 symmetric game. Players using the simple decision rule evaluate the strategies by comparing their current playoffs to those of an opponent currently playing the other strategy,...

Using techniques from evolutionary game theory, we analyze potential games with continuous player sets, a class of games which includes a general model of network congestion as a special case. We concisely characterize both the complete set of Nash equilibria and the set of equilibria which are...

A population of agents recurrently plays a two-strategy population game. When an agent receives a revision opportunity, he chooses a new strategy using a noisy best response rule that satisfies mild regularity conditions; best response with mutations, logit choice, and probit choice are all...

We prove that any regular ESS is asymptotically stable under any impartial pairwise comparison dynamic, including the Smith dynamic; under any separable excess payoff dynamic, including the BNN dynamic; and under the best response dynamic. Combined with existing results for imitative dynamics, our...

We prove that any deterministic evolutionary dynamic satisfying four mild requirements fails to eliminate strictly dominated strategies in some games. We also show that existing elimination results for evolutionary dynamics are not robust to small changes in the specifications of the dynamics....

We consider a model of evolution in games in which a revising agent observes the actions of a random number of randomly sampled opponents and then chooses a best response to the distribution of actions in the sample. We provide a condition on the distribution of sample sizes under which an...