Similar Search Results

Group specific public goods, orchestration of interest groups and free riding

Epstein, Gil S.; Mealem, Yosef - 2009

We consider a two group contest over a group specific public good where each member of a group has a different benefit from the good. Our model can be interpreted in two ways: Each of the players has a non-linear investment cost in the contest, or alternatively, the returns to effort are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010336001

Cooperation and effort in group contests

Epstein, Gil S.; Mealem, Yosef - 2011

We consider a two group contest over a group specific public good comparing two situations: (i) when all players act independently; and (ii) when the players of each group cooperate. This comparison leads us to the conclusion that it is possible for one group to contribute more (and have a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010336057

Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry

Choi, Jay Pil; Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Kim, Jaesoo - 2014

We investigate situations in which players make costly contributions as group members in a group conflict, and at the … asymmetry and complementarity in members' efforts, and analyze how each group's internal conflict in-fluences its chance of … winning in the external conflict. We find that a more symmetric group may expend more effort in external conflict when the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010480849

More than words: Communication in intergroup conflicts

Leibbrandt, Andreas; Sääksvuori, Lauri - 2010

collective action in the context of finitely repeated intergroup conflict and demonstrate that conflict expenditures are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281661

More frequent commitments promote cooperation, ratcheting does not

Ockenfels, Axel; Gallier, Carlo; Sturm, Bodo - 2024

International climate negotiations have so far failed to produce ambitious climate cooperation. We combine laboratory experiments with simulations to investigate the performance of two negotiation design features to address this failure: The Paris Agreement's ratchet-up mechanism, which requires...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015211854

Aggregation in networks

Allouch, Nizar - 2021

In this paper, we show that a concept of aggregation can hold in large network games with linear best replies. Breaking up large networks into smaller subnetworks, which can be replaced by representative players, leads to a coarse-grained description of strategic interactions. This method of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013396062

Willingness to volunteer among remote workers is insensitive to the team size

Hillenbrand, Adrian; Werner, Tobias; Winter, Fabian - 2022

Volunteering is a widespread allocation mechanism in the workplace. It emerges naturally in software development or the generation of online knowledge platforms. Using a field experiment with more than 2000 workers, we study the effect of team size on volunteering in an online labor market. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013412971

Collective minimum contributions to counteract the ratchet effect in the voluntary provision of public goods

Alt, Marius; Gallier, Carlo; Kesternich, Martin; Sturm, Bodo - 2022

We experimentally test a theoretically promising amendment to the ratchet-up mechanism of the Paris Agreement. The ratchet-up mechanism prescribes that parties' commitments to the global response to climate change cannot decrease over time and our results confirm that its effect is detrimental....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013464275

A mechanism of proportional contributions for public good games

Duesterhoeft, Ilka; Rogna, Marco; Vogt, Carla - 2023

Public good games in coalitional form, such as the ones depicting international environmental agreements for the reduction of a global pollutant, generally foresee scarce levels of cooperation. The incentive to free ride, that increases for higher levels of cooperation, prevents the formation of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013532877

A Group Public Goods Game with Position Uncertainty

Anwar, Sakib; Bruno, Jorge; SenGupta, Sonali - 2022

We model a dynamic public good contribution game, where players are (naturally) formed into groups. The groups are exogenously placed in a sequence, with limited information available to players about their groups' position in the sequence. Contribution decisions are made by players...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014284491