Candidates compete to persuade a decision maker. The decision maker wishes to select a candidate who possesses a certain ability. Then, as a signaling, each candidate decides whether to perform a task whose performance statistically reflects the ability. However, since the cost of the...

When hiring an adviser (he), a policy maker (she) often faces the problem that she has incomplete information about his preferences. Some advisers are good, in the sense that their preferences are closely aligned to the policy maker's preferences, and some advisers are bad. Recently, some...

This paper considers the e effcts of a two-period interaction on the decision of a principal to delegate authority to a potentially biased but better informed agent. Compared to the (repeated) one-period case, the agent's first period actions may also signal his type which in turn impacts wages...

Cash-rich bidders in UK have better announcement abnormal returns than cash-poor ones during 1984-2007, contrasting previous findings in the US. The positive cash reserve effect is mainly from bidders of high long-run growth or those with non-trivial institutional holdings. Moreover, cash-rich...

A cash-rich company is less likely to be a bidder during 1994-2008 in the US, contrasting the findings based on earlier sample period. This is mainly due to the companies with high residual market-to-book ratios (i.e. the residual of the actual market-to-book ratio regressed on measures of...

A committee makes a decision on a project on behalf of the public. Members of the committee agree on the a priori value of the project, and hold additional private information about its consequences. They are experts who care about the value of the project and about being considered well...

In a recent paper, Jäger, Metzger, and Riedel (2011) study communication games of common interest when signals are simple and types complex. They characterize strict Nash equilibria as so-called Voronoi languages that consist of Voronoi tesselations of the type set and Bayesian estimators on...