We use a field experiment to identify how differences in preferences and autonomy in decision-making result in low willingness-to-pay (WTP) for technologies that can benefit all members of the household. We create income earning opportunities to empower households and elicit their WTP for fuel,...

This paper aims to contribute to understanding the existing knowledge gaps in the linkages of energy, water, and land use in Southeast Asia and explores the political economy of energy transition in the Mekong region (MR). Investigating the struggle over hydropower development and...

A party can address only a limited number of issues when in power. What issues to address - the party's agenda - has dynamic implications because it affects what issues will be addressed in the future. We analyze a model in which the incumbent in each period addresses one issue among several...

In the present work, agreement on allocation of payments from multiple issues requires unanimous consent of all parties involved. The agents are assumed to know the aggregate payoffs but do not know their decomposition by issues. This framework applies to many real-world problems, such as the...

This paper considers pure strategy Nash equilibria of non-cooperative legislative bargaining models. In contrast to existing legislative bargaining models, we derive legislators behavior from stochastic utility maximization. This approach allows us to prove the existence of a stationary Pure...

We model monopsony on the labor market using a separable matching model a la Choo and Siow (2006). We propose a simple method that estimates 1) the multidimensional determinants of productivity and non-wage preferences separately and 2) the variance of unobserved heterogeneity on both sides of...

Microcredit, a financial tool providing uncollateralized loans to low-income individuals, has seen a shift from joint-liability (JL) to individual liabil- ity (IL) lending models. This article tests a theory explaining this shift, focusing on borrowers matching into groups exposed to similar...

This paper theoretically investigates the strategic implications of varying reliability of bargaining partners under unanimous and non-unanimous voting. Three players (one proposer, two responders) bargain over the distribution of a pie. One responder has private information about his valuation...

This paper investigates the role of structural imbalance between job seekers and job openings for the forecasting performance of a labour market matching function. Starting from a Cobb-Douglas matching function with constant returns to scale (CRS) in each frictional micro market shows that on...

This study explores mechanism design with allocation-based social preferences. Agents' social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents' social preferences...