Similar Search Results

The effect of IMF lending on the probability of sovereign debt crises

Jorra, Markus - 2010

This paper explores empirically how the adoption of IMF programs affects sovereign risk over the medium term. We find that IMF programs significantly increase the probability of subsequent sovereign defaults by approximately 1.5 to 2 percentage points. These results cannot be attributed to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286366

The development and implementation of IMF and World Bank conditionality

Dreher, Axel - 2002

The paper presents a detailed description of IMF and World Bank conditionality and tries to explain changes in this … conditions seem to be influenced by contemporaneous World Bank activity. Moreover, the paper tries to explain compliance with … World Bank conditionality as well as interruptions of IMF programs in the recipient countries. Compliance with World Bank …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010295488

Independent actor or agent? An empirical analysis of the impact of US interests on IMF conditions

Dreher, Axel; Jensen, Nathan - 2005

In this paper we analyze whether IMF conditionality is exclusively designed in line with observable economic indicators or, alternatively, whether it is partly driven by its major shareholder, the US. A panel data analysis of 206 letters of intent from 38 countries over the period 4/1997-2/2003...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010285909

Agency and communication in IMF conditional lending: theory and empirical evidence

Marchesi, Silvia; Sabani, Laura; Dreher, Axel - 2009

We focus on the role that the transmission of information between a multilateral (the IMF) and a country has for the optimal design of conditional reforms. Our model predicts that when agency problems are especially severe, and/or IMF information is valuable, a centralized control is indeed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264578

The future of the IMF: how to prevent the next global financial crisis

Siebert, Horst - 1998

The paper analyzes how the next financial crisis can be prevented and which role the IMF should play. The paper distinguishes between the improvement of existing instruments and solving the moral hazard problem. Both issues are interrelated. The size of operation of the IMF creates a moral...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010265351

Agency and communication in IMF conditional lending: theory and empirical evidence

Marchesi, Silvia; Sabani, Laura; Dreher, Axel - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269064

Preventing financial instability and currency crises

Siebert, Horst - 2008

of the IMF in light of the past experience in preventing currency crises and a systemic breakdown of the world … world economy. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273151

Agency and communication in IMF conditional lending: Theory and empirical evidence

Marchesi, Silvia; Sabani, Laura; Dreher, Axel - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281823

IMF lending and geopolitics

Reynaud, Julien; Vauday, Julien - 2008

There is growing awareness that the distribution of IMF facilities may not be influenced only by the economic needs of the borrowers. This paper focuses on the fact that the IMF may favour geopolitically important countries in the distribution of IMF loans, differentiating between concessional...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011605011

IMF surveillance and financial markets: A political economy analysis

Fratzscher, Marcel; Reynaud, Julien - 2010

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is in the process of re-inventing itself with bilateral and multilateral surveillance emerging as a key function. The paper analyses how IMF surveillance announcements may be influenced by political power that member countries exert at the IMF. First, we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270537