The common use of majority rule in group decision making is puzzling. In theory, it inequitably favors the proposer, and paradoxically, it disadvantages voters further if they are inequity averse. In practice, however, outcomes are equitable. The present paper analyzes data from a novel...

We compare dictator and impunity games. In impunity games, responders can reject offers but to no payoff consequence to proposers. Because proposers act under impunity, we should expect the same behavior across games, but experimentally observed behavior varies. Responders indeed exercise the...

Why do people give when asked, but prefer not to be asked, and even take when possible? We introduce a novel analytical framework that allows us to express context dependence and narrow bracketing axiomatically. We then derive the utility representation of distributive preferences additionally...

We report on the results of an experiment designed to disentangle behavioral biases in information aggregation of committees. Subjects get private signals about the state of world, send binary messages, and finally vote under either majority or unanimity rules. Committee decisions are...

Li (Am Econ Rev 107(11):3257–3287, 2017) introduces a theoretical notion of obviousness of a dominant strategy, to be used as a refinement in mechanism design. This notion is supported by experimental evidence that bidding is closer to dominance in the dynamic ascending-clock auction than the...

This paper considers a decision maker choosing from a set of options when options have multiple real-valued attributes. Assuming DM chooses all options with positive probability, four invariance assumptions are necessary and sufficient for choice probabilities to take McFadden’s conditional...

When voting takes place in democratic institutions, we find (either explicitly or implicitly) that there is an agenda setter or a formateur. Such players are uniquely able to make substantive proposals for given topics. Their statuses remain intact even after rejection of proposals, but they...

We analyze vertical structures where a regulated network operator serves n network users, and the network users compete in quantities for customers. We distinguish two cases: (i) none of the network users are related to the network operator (ownership unbundling), (ii) one of the network users...

European and national cartel authorities have required dominant national gas pipelines to auction off certain quantities (typically about 10 % of their sales) to competitors. Do such auctions really improve the competitiveness of the wholesale market? Based on a model where oligopolistic...

People overestimate the probability that others share their values or preferences. I introduce type projection equilibrium (TPE) to capture such projection in Bayesian games. TPE allows each player to believe his opponents share his type with intermediate probability \rho. After establishing...