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Social Interaction, Co-Worker Altruism, and Incentives

Dur, Robert; Sol, Joeri - 2008

damage the work climate. We show that both team incentives and relative incentives can help to create a good work climate. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325990

Team Governance: Empowerment or Hierarchical Control

Friebel, Guido; Schnedler, Wendelin - 2007

We investigate a team setting in which workers have different degrees of commitment to the outcome of their work. We … show that if there are complementarities in production and if the team manager has some information about team members … identifies that team governance is driven by the importance of tasks that cannot be monitored. The more important these tasks …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011422162

The crowding-out of work ethics

Grepperud, Sverre; Pedersen, Pål Andreas - 2001

This paper analyses optimal contracts in a principal-agent model where the agent is intrinsically motivated at the outset and there is an endogenous relationship between the structure of incentive payments and intrinsic motivation (crowding effects). The analysis shows that crowding effects have...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010290692

The role of salience in performance schemes: Evidence from a field experiment

Englmaier, Florian; Roider, Andreas; Sunde, Uwe - 2012

tasks. We analyze the effects of the salience of incentives in a team production setting where the principal has an interest …, reduces quality, and increases in-pocket income of team managers. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281805

The role of salience in performance schemes: Evidence from a field experiment

Englmaier, Florian; Roider, Andreas; Sunde, Uwe - 2012

tasks. We analyze the effects of the salience of incentives in a team production setting where the principal has an interest …, reduces quality, and increases in-pocket income of team managers. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282221

Performance Measurement, Expectancy and Agency Theory: An Experimental Study

Sloof, Randolph; van Praag, Mirjam - 2007

noise in the performance measure. In contrast, expectancy theory as developed by psychologists predicts lower effort levels …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325571

Corporate Governance und Unternehmenserfolg - Eine empirische Analyse des Zusammenhangs zwischen den Führungs-, Kontroll- und Anreizstrukturen und der Geschäftsentwicklung deutscher Banken

Steinbrecher, Johannes - 2016

Das internationale Bankensystem stand in den vergangenen Jahren im Fokus des öffentlichen Interesses. Bei der Diskussion möglicher Optionen zur Verbesserung der Finanzsystemstabilität rückt zunehmend die Corporate Governance in Banken in den Fokus. Der vorliegende Forschungsbericht widmet...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011698354

Transparency, inequity aversion, and the dynamics of peer pressure in teams: theory and evidence

Mohnen, Alwine; Pokorny, Kathrin; Sliwka, Dirk - 2008

We provide an explanation for peer pressure in teams based on inequity aversion. Analyzing a two-period model with two agents, we find that the effect of inequity aversion strongly depends on the information structure. When contributions are unobservable, agents act as if they were purely...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268881

Extrinsic rewards and intrinsic motives: Standard and behavioral approaches to agency and labor markets

Rebitzer, James B.; Taylor, Lowell J. - 2010

Employers structure pay and employment relationships to mitigate agency problems. A large literature in economics documents how the resolution of these problems shapes personnel policies and labor markets. For the most part, the study of agency in employment relationships relies on highly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272684

Wage floors and optimal job design

Kragl, Jenny; Schöttner, Anja - 2011

We analyze the effects of lower bounds on wages, e.g., minimum wages or liability limits, on job design within firms. In our model, two tasks contribute to non-veriable firm value and affect an imperfect performance measure. The tasks can be assigned to either one or two agents. In the absence...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293373