We consider deterministic dominant strategy implementation in multidimensional dichotomous domains in private values and quasi-linear utility setting. In such multidimensional domains, an agent’s type is characterized by a single number, the value of the agent, and a non-empty set of...

We consider voting rules on a multidimensional policy space for a continuum of voters with elliptic preferences. Assuming continuity, gamma -strategy-proofnessmeaning that coalitions of size smaller or equal to a small number gamma cannot manipulateand unanimity, we show that such rules are...

Theorem 1 in Bhargava, Mohit et al. (2015) provides a necessary condition for a social choice function to be LOBIC with respect to a belief system satisfying top-set (TS) correlation. In this paper, we provide a counter example to that theorem and consequently provide a new necessary condition...

We provide a full characterisation of the set of trading equilibria (in which all goods are traded at a positive price) in a strategic market game (as introduced by Shapley and Shubik),for both the "buy and sell" and the "buy or sell" versions of this model under standard assumptions on the...

The paper considers a voting model where each voter's type is her preference. The type graph for a voter is a graph whose vertices are the possible types of the voter. Two vertices are connected by an edge in the graph if the associated types are "neighbors." A social choice function is locally...

We study deterministic voting mechanisms by considering an ordinal notion of Bayesian incentive compatibility (OBIC). If the beliefs of agents are independent and generic, we show that any OBIC mechanism is dominant strategy incentive compatible under an additional mild requirement. Our result...

A seller is selling multiple objects to a set of agents. Each agent can buy at most one object and his utility over consumption bundles (i.e., (object,transfer) pairs) need not be quasilinear. The seller considers the following desiderata for her mechanism, which she terms desirable: (1)...

This paper studies a model of mechanism design with transfers where agents' preferences need not be quasilinear. In such a model, (1) we characterize dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms using a monotonicity property; (2) we establish a revenue uniqueness result: for every dominant...

This paper studies a model of mechanism design with transfers where agents' preferences need not be quasilinear. In such a model, (1) we characterize dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms using a monotonicity property; (2) we establish a revenue uniqueness result: for every dominant...

We study a model of voting with two alternatives in a symmetric environment. We characterize the interim allocation probabilities that can be implemented by a symmetric voting rule. We show that every such interim allocation probability can be implemented as a convex combination of two families...