Empirical evidence shows that an increase in trade liberalisation causes an increase in foreign direct investments (FDIs). Here we propose an explanation to this apparent puzzle by exploiting the intensity of competition in a Bertrand duopoly with convex costs where the two firms enter in a new...

This paper investigates the impact of free trade on welfare in a two-country world modelled as an international Hotelling duopoly with quadratic transport costs and asymmetric countries, where a negative environmental externality is associated with the consumption of the good produced in the...

This paper investigates the relationship between trade liberalisation, consumers' environmental awareness and a negative environmental externality in consumption. We adopt an international Hotelling duopoly setup, where firms are located in two asymmetric countries. We find that, if the...

This paper focuses on the functional specialisation of a system of cities, with particular attention to the role and the formation process of secondary business centers. At the European level, the latters can be identified in the large number of regional capitals, and properly defined as cities...

The authors modify the price-setting version of the vertically differentiated duopoly model by Aoki (Effect of Credible Quality Investment with Bertrand and Cournot Competition, 2003) by introducing an extended game in which firms noncooperatively choose the timing of moves at the quality stage....

We examine the relationship between competition and innovation in an industry where production is polluting and R&D aims to reduce emissions ("green" innovation). We present an n-firm oligopoly where firms compete in quantities and decide their investment in "green" R&D. When environmental...

A well established dynamic model describing the impact of oligopolistic interaction on a renewable resource is revisited here to illustrate its dual interpretation as a waste removal differential game. The regulatory implications are illustrated by assuming that the public agency may control...

We investigate the possibility for two vertically related firms to at least partially collude on the wholesale price over an in.nite horizon to mitigate or eliminate the e¤ects of double marginalisation, thereby avoiding contracts which might not be enforceable. We characterise alternative...

We revisit the well known differential Cournot game with polluting emissions dating back to Benchekroun and Long (1998), proposing a version of the model in which environmental taxation is levied on emissions rather than the environmental damage. This allows to attain strong time consistency...

We investigate the relationship between market concentration and industry innovative effort within a familiar two-stage model of R&D race in which firms compete à la Cournot in the product market. With the help of numerical simulations, we show that such a setting is rich enough to generate...