This paper develops a dynamic two-country neoclassical stochastic growth model with incomplete markets. Short-term credit flows can be excessive and reverse suddenly. The equilibrium outcome is constrained inefficient due to pecuniary externalities. First, an undercapitalized country borrows too...

This paper incorporates a bubble term in the standard FTPL equation to explain why countries with persistently negative primary surpluses can have a positively valued currency and low inflation. It also provides an example with closed-form solutions in which idiosyncratic risk on capital...

The price of a safe asset reflects not only the expected discounted future cash flows but also future service flows, since retrading allows partial insurance of idiosyncratic risk in an incomplete markets setting. This lowers the issuers' interest burden and allows the government to run a...

This paper studies the full equilibrium dynamics of an economy with financial frictions. Due to highly non-linear amplification effects, the economy is prone to instability and occasionally enters volatile episodes. Risk is endogenous and asset price correlations are high in down turns. In an...

Consider repeated two-player games with perfect monitoring and discounting. We provide an algorithm that computes the set V* of payoff pairs of all pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibria with public randomization. The algorithm provides significant efficiency gains over the existing...

We compare three common dispute resolution processes - negotiation, mediation, and arbitration - in the framework of Crawford and Sobel (1982). Under negotiation, the two parties engage in (possibly arbitrarily long) face-to-face cheap talk. Under mediation, the parties communicate with a...

We study an in.nitely-repeated .rst-price auction with common values. Initially, bid-ders receive independent private signals about the objects. value, which itself does not change over time. Learning occurs only through observation of the bids. Under one-sided incomplete information, this...

We study the relationship between a player's (stage game) minmax payoff and the individually rational payoff in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. We characterize the signal structures under which these two payoffs coincide for any payoff matrix. Under a full rank assumption, we further...

We consider an example of a Markov game with lack of information on one side, that was .rst introduced by Renault (2002). We compute both the value and optimal strategies for a range of parameter values.

This paper studies strongly symmetric equilibria (SSE) in continuous-time games of strategic experimentation with Poisson bandits. SSE payoffs can be studied via two functional equations similar to the HJB equation used for Markov equilibria. This is valuable for three reasons. First, these...