, 2006) proved that any strict equilibrium in bounded-recall strategies of a game with full support public monitoring is … theorem continues to hold when attention is restricted to strategies with bounded recall and the equilibrium is essentially …

discontinuity in the equilibrium outcome correspondence with respect to small switching costs. We conclude that there is not a …

Markov perfection has become the usual solution concept to determine the non-cooperative equilibrium in a dynamic game …

laboratory, we focus on extended prisoners' dilemma games in which a second (pure strategy) equilibrium allows for voluntary … versus non-strict additional equilibrium compared to the control treatment, a standard prisoners' dilemma. Quite surprisingly …, according to our results, only a strict additional equilibrium increases cooperation rate for a given time horizon. As expected …

identifies conditions under which an equilibrium collusion scheme is fully efficient in the sense that the bidders' payoff is …

each state to a payoff vector that is feasible and individually rational in that state, there is a sequential equilibrium …

perfect and public equilibrium payoffs as discount factors converge to 1 with the relative patience between players fixed. We …