In a 1999 paper, Freeman proposes a model in which discount window lending and open market operations have different outcomes—an important development because in most of the literature the results of these policy tools are indistinguishable. Freeman’s conclusion that the central bank should...

In the Canadian large value payment system an important goal is to understand how liquidity is transferred through the system and hence how efficient the system is in settling payments. Understanding the structure of the underlying network of relationships between participants in the payment...

We use a method similar to Google's PageRank procedure to rank banks in the Canadian Large Value Transfer System (LVTS). Along the way we obtain estimates of the payment processing speeds for the individual banks. These differences in processing speeds are essential for explaining why observed...

Given the increasing interdependence of both financial systems and attendant payment and settlement systems a vital question is what form should optimal policy take when there are two connected payment systems with separate regulators. In this paper I show that two central banks operating in a...

Recently, economists have argued that a bank's importance within the financial system depends not only on its individual characteristics but also on its position within the banking network. A bank is deemed to be 'central' if, based on our network analysis, it is predicted to hold the most...

We offer a parsimonious model of the reserve demand to study the tradeoffs associated with various monetary policy implementation frameworks. Prior to the 2007-09 financial crisis, many central banks supplied scarce reserves to execute their interest-rate policies. In response to the crisis,...

The events from the 2007-2009 financial crisis have raised concerns that the failure of large financial institutions can lead to destabilizing fire sales of assets. The risk of fire sales is related to exemptions from bankruptcy's automatic stay provision enjoyed by a number of financial...

We build a model in which financial intermediaries provide insurance to households against a liquidity shock. Households can also invest directly on a financial market if they pay a cost. In equilibrium, the ability of intermediaries to share risk is constrained by the market. This can be...

Following Diamond (1997) and Fecht (2004) we use a model in which financial market access of households restrains the efficiency of the liquidity insurance that banks' deposit contracts provide to households that are subject to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. But in contrast to these approaches...

This paper develops a model of financial institutions that borrow short term and invest in longterm assets that can be traded in frictionless markets. Because these financial intermediaries perform maturity transformation, they are subject to potential runs. We derive distinct liquidity,...