In Bonanno (Int. J. Game Theory, 42:567-592, 2013) a general notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) was introduced for extensive-form games and shown to be intermediate between subgame-perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium. The essential ingredient of the proposed notion is the...

The paper provides a specification of belief systems for models of large economies with anonymity in which aggregate states depend only on cross-section distributions of types. For belief systems satisfying certain conditions of mutual absolute continuity, the paper gives a necessary and...

A new, biologically driven model of human behavior in which reason is tethered to the evolutionarily older autonomic, instinctive, and associative systems. In Reason and Less, Vinod Goel explains the workings of the tethered mind. Reason does not float on top of our biology but is tethered to...

We provide a new characterization of AGM belief revision in terms of a Kripke-Stalnaker-Lewis semantics. We consider pointed frames consisting of a set of states, a distinguished state interpreted as the actual state, a Kripke belief relation and a Stalnaker-Lewis selection function. Adding a...

We provide a new characterization of both belief update and belief revision in terms of a Kripke-Lewis semantics. We consider frames consisting of a set of states, a Kripke belief relation and a Lewis selection function. Adding a valuation to a frame yields a model. Given a model and a state, we...

What predictions about behavior in extensive form games can we rigorously justify as implied by rationality or mutual or common knowledge of that rationality? This paper models rational belief revision in extensive form games and uses numerical methods to examine the implications for equilibrium...

We discuss a number of conceptual issues that arise in attempting to capture, in dynamic games, the notion that there is common understanding among the players that they are all rational.