Implementation theory assumes that participants' choices are rational, in the sense of being derived from the maximization of a contextindependent preference. The paper investigates implementation under complete information when the mechanism designer is aware that individuals suffer from...

Incorporating bounded rationality into the classic consumer theory setting, we study the testable implications of a consumer who may have trouble consistently assessing her subjective tastes. Our model of E-Rationalizability, which bounds the consumer's misperception of her marginal rates of...

A decision maker may not perfectly maximize her preference over the feasible set. She may feel it is good enough to maximize her preference over a sufficiently large consideration set; or just require that her choice is sufficiently well-ranked (e.g., in the top quintile of options); or even...

Each period, a principal must assign one of two agents to a new task. Profit is stochastically higher when the agent is qualified for the task, but the principal cannot observe qualification. Her only decision is which of the two agents to assign, if any, given the public history of selections...

Bounded rationality theories are typically characterized over exhaustive data sets. We develop a methodology to understand the empirical content of such theories with limited data, adapting the classic, revealed-preference approach to new forms of revealed information. We apply our approach to...