insurance markets with adverse selection and without commitment. Under the consideration of the inherent costs related to the … loss of privacy, the paper analyzes the incentives of insureds to reveal information, whereby they can decide how much or …

to adverse selection in insurance markets. However, some consumers value their privacy and dislike sharing private … risk type for an individual subjective cost and show analytically how this affects insurance market equilibria as well as … digitalization. It shows that new technologies bring new ways to challenge crosssubsidization in insurance markets and stresses the …

We consider a competitive insurance market with adverse selection. Unlike the standard models, we assume that … limited liability afforded via bankruptcy laws. Government assistance is calculated ex post of any insurance benefits. This … alters the individuals? demand for insurance coverage. In turn, this affects equilibria in various insurance models of …

We analyse a 2-period competitive insurance market which is characterized by the simultaneous presence of standard … which patient consumers use high effort and buy a profit-making insurance contract with high coverage, whereas impatient …

insureds in automobile insurance markets both for perfect competition and for monopoly. Specifically, we assume that insurers … Pareto-improvement also in these cases. Privacy concerns do not alter our positive welfare results. …

This paper considers moral hazard in insurance markets when voluntary monitoring technologies are available and … insureds may choose the precision of monitoring. Also privacy costs incurred thereby are taken into account. Two alternative … contract schemes are compared in terms of welfare: (i) monitoring conditional on the loss with only the insurance indemnities …

This paper considers moral hazard insurance markets when voluntary monitoring technologies are available and insureds … may choose the precision of monitoring. Also privacy costs incurred thereby are taken into account. Two alternative … contract schemes are compared in terms of welfare: (i) monitoring conditional on the loss with only the insurance indemnities …

We examine equilibria in competitive insurance markets with adverse selection when wealth differences arise … ceteris paribus exhibit the lower marginal willingness to pay for insurance than low risks, a phenomenon that we refer to as …

We examine equilibria in competitive insurance markets when individuals take unobservable labor supply decisions …. Precautionary labor motives introduce countervailing incentives in the insurance market, and equilibria with positive profits can … insurance market since precautionary labor effects lead to differences in income and hence risk aversion. Under these …