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In the Solidarity game lucky winners of a lottery can transfer part of their income to unlucky losers. Will losers get smaller transfers if they can be assumed to be responsible for their zero income because they have chosen riskier lotteries? Or will risk-lovers and riskaverters favor those who...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010319174
Das Forschungsprojekt hatte zum Ziel, die Innovationsperformance von KMU in Baden- Württemberg im Vergleich zu KMU aus anderen deutschen Bundesländern zu untersuchen und die Faktoren zu analysieren, die für eine möglicherweise überdurchschnittlich hohe Innovationsperformance der...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010300984
A solidarity game was conducted where participants were able to choose between two lotteries with same expected values. However, in one lottery, the risky one, participants faced a higher probability to receive no endowment. The winners were then able to discriminate between subjects risk...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010304288
Innovationen sind von zentraler Bedeutung für Wachstum und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung der deutschen Volkswirtschaft. Neben der Höhe der Aufwendungen für Forschung und Entwicklung ist auch die Qualität des Mitteleinsatzes entscheidend. Aufgrund der Komplexität von Innovationsprozessen sind...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011602004
Most voting models in the literature neglect abstention, but is such a simplification justified? I investigate this question in a model with outside pressure on voters. For sequential voting (e.g., roll call votes), with and without an abstention option, there is a unique subgame perfect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014485815
When including outside pressure on voters as individual costs, sequential voting (as in roll call votes) is theoretically preferable to simultaneous voting (as in recorded ballots). Under complete information, sequential voting has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium with a simple equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014497559
In random voting, the committee chair, whose vote decides in the case of a draw, is more often decisive than ordinary voters. Therefore, in the power indices literature, the committee chair is said to be more powerful. Players with a veto right are even more powerful still. Similarly, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014501610
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In the Solidarity Game (Selten and Ockenfels, 1998), two "rich" persons can support a "poor" one. A strong positive correlation between one rich person's solidarity contribution and his expected contribution of the other is observed. This paper investigates the causality behind this correlation....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010297227