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This paper revisits the licensing of a non-drastic process innovation by an outside innovator to a Cournot oligopoly …. We propose a new mechanism that combines a restrictive license auction with royalty licensing. This mechanism is more … profitable than standard license auctions, auctioning royalty contracts, fixed-fee licensing, pure royalty licensing, and two …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333797
We consider a licensing mechanism for process innovations that combines a license auction with royalty contracts to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333873
This paper revisits the standard analysis of licensing a cost reducing innovation by an outside innovator to a Cournot … oligopoly. We propose a new mechanism that combines elements of a license auction with royalty licensing by granting the losers … licensing without reducing bidders' surplus; therefore, it is more profitable than both standard license auctions and pure …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333918
This paper reconsiders the licensing of a common value innovation to a downstream duopoly, assuming a dual licensing …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334125
We consider an economy in which firms need to invest in capital before they can advertise a job, while applicants may have to compete for jobs. Our aim is to investigate how this competition affects the investment decisions of firms. Our first result shows that the economy always generates the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261761
Competition in some markets is a contest. This paper studies the merger incentives in such markets. Merger can be profitable. The profitability depends on the post-merger contest structure, the discriminatory power of the contest and on the number of contestants.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010310200
To be represented by more than one contestant in a contest has advantages and disadvantages. This paper determines the conditions under which it is favorable to send several agents into the contest.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010310208
particular, when the prize function is approximately linear. We use the results to compare patents and prizes as innovation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316920
When opposing parties compete for a prize, the sunk effort players exert during the conflict can affect the value of the winner's reward. These spillovers can have substantial influence on the equilibrium behavior of participants in applications such as lobbying, warfare, labor tournaments,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536891
If firms compete in all-pay auctions with complete information, silent shareholdings introduce asymmetric externalities into the all-pay auction framework. If the strongest firm owns a large share in the second strongest firm, this may make the strongest firm abstain from bidding. As a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261198