We analyze the efficiency defense in merger control. First, we show that the relationship between exogenous efficiency gains and social welfare can be non-monotone. Second, we consider both endogenous mergers and endogenous efficiencies and find that merger proposals are largely aligned with a...

We analyze the impact of partial public ownership (PPO) on managerial incentives. A novelty of the paper is that it explicitly considers competition in the product market. We find that PPO negatively affects managerial incentives when all firms are partially owned by the government. When...

The German reserve power market was subject to important regulatory changes in recent years. A new market design was created by synchronization and interconnection of the four control areas. In this paper, we analyze whether or not the reforms led to lower prices for minute reserve power (MRP)....

We analyze a constrained dictator game in which the dictator splits a pie which will be subsequently created through simultaneous investments by herself and the recipient. We consider two treatments by varying the maximum attainable size of the pie leading to either high or low investment...

We analyze horizontal mergers when the acquirer holds a passive partial ownership stake (PPO) in the target firm prior to the merger. We show that a PPO reduces the minimal synergy level necessary to make a merger beneficial for consumers. It follows that an antitrust authority ignoring existing...

Im Rahmen der Sektoruntersuchung des Großhandelsmarktes für Strom hat das Bundeskartellamt 2011 die Auffassung dargelegt, dass marktbeherrschende Unternehmen keine Preisgebote oberhalb der Grenzkosten abgeben dürfen. In dem vorliegenden Beitrag werden die Auswirkungen einer solchen...

We analyze the effects of synergies from horizontal mergers in a Cournot oligopoly where principals provide their agents with incentives to cut marginal costs prior to choosing output. We stress that synergies come at a cost which possibly leads to a countervailing incentive effect: The merged...

Minderheitsbeteiligungen in der Zusammenschlusskontrolle stärker zu berücksichtigen, ist umstritten. Minderheitsbeteiligungen können wohlfahrtsschädigende Wirkungen haben, da sie die Wettbewerbsanreize desjenigen Unternehmens senken, das Anteile an einem seiner Konkurrenten hält. Wir...

This paper argues that it cannot be taken for granted that any merger that raises consumer surplus also increases social welfare. We assume a Cournot model with homogeneous goods, linear demand, and constant marginal costs, to show that a merger can raise consumer surplus while harming social...