games based on the idea of the Average Tree value for cycle-free communication graph games. We provide two axiomatizations …

use efficiency which is not satisfied by the Banzhaf value. On the other hand, the Banzhaf value satisfies collusion … these axioms characterize the equal division solution. Further, we show that there is no solution that satisfies efficiency …, collusion neutrality and the null player property. Finally, we show that a solution satisfies efficiency, collusion neutrality …

We introduce an efficient solution for games with communication graph structures and show that it is characterized by … efficiency, fairness and a new axiom called component balancedness. This latter axiom compares for every component in the … communication graph the total payoff to the players of this component in the game itself to the total payoff of these players when …

product. We have found the two member coalition which forms and we have checked its stability. …