the opportunity to engage in a sequence of battles in an attempt to win the war. Each battle is an all-pay auction in … states of the game, the "tipping states", which are determined by the contestants' relative strengths, their distances to … by which the allocation of prizes are governed by possibly repeated conflict. Our results contribute to an explanation …

the opportunity to engage in a sequence of battles in an attempt to win the war. Each battle is an all-pay auction in … states of the game, the tipping states, which are determined by the contestants' relative strengths, their distances to final … by which the allocation of prizes are governed by possibly repeated conflict. Our results contribute to an explanation …

the opportunity to engage in a sequence of battles in an attempt to win the war. Each battle is an all-pay auction in … states of the game, the tipping states, which are determined by the contestants' relative strengths, their distances to final … by which the allocation of prizes are governed by possibly repeated conflict. Our results contribute to an explanation …

component contest is an all-pay auction with complete information. We characterize the unique equilibrium analytically and …

, we show that substituting the auction contest success function for the lottery contest success function in a conflict may … radicals. Our results demonstrate the importance of the choice of the institutions of conflict, as modeled by the contest …

all-pay auction is appealing in two senses. First, it ensures exceptional equitable final prize valuations. Second, it is …

We study the role of inter-group differences in the emergence of conflict. In our setting, two groups compete for the …, that the opposition can either accept, or reject and wage conflict. Expropriating a large share of resources increases … of conflict. In equilibrium, allocations are non-monotonic in the cost of mobility. Moreover, limited commitment with …

I study a two-period model of conflict with two combatants and a third party who is an ally of one of the combatants …. There exist perfect Bayesian equilibria in which the third party's intervention worsens the conflict by energizing her ally … to withdraw from or stay in the conflict is based on her prior beliefs and not on the current conditions of the conflict …