takeover of Mannesmann in 2000 and it is again in the spotlight since the outbreak of the financial crisis of 2009. Based on … work for. We reject, however, the efficient pay hypothesis as CEO pay and the demand for managers increases in Germany in … difficult times when the typical firm size shrinks. We find further that domestic and global competition for managers has …

takeover of Mannesmann in 2000 and it is again in the spotlight since the outbreak of the financial crisis of 2009. Based on … work for. We reject, however, the efficient pay hypothesis as CEO pay and the demand for managers increases in Germany in … difficult times when the typical firm size shrinks. We find further that domestic and global competition for managers has …

shareholders who press for shareholder value and the importance of the equity market have traditionally been low. But there are … crumbling. Change in the direction of shareholder value is therefore limited. The take-over of Mannesmann by Vodafone after a 3 …

for corporate control have not played a significant role. This case study of the hostile takeover of Mannesmann AG by … both claims by agency theory for the efficiency of takeover markets, as well as the institutional complementarities within …

higher takeover prices, which is expected to increase shareholders' wealth. These two hypotheses have been widely tested in …The adoption of takeover protections, from the empirical side, has been focused to find supporting evidence to the … decisions for additional takeover defenses are taken. Alternatively, external control gives more negotiation power, allowing for …

) directors. In contrast, this paper shows that some lack of board independence can be in the interest of shareholders. This … shareholders if the problem of providing appropriate incentives to the CEO is weak (severe). …

takeover imposed by the market for corporate control. We complement other empirical studies on managerial compensation and … consists of 51 firms in the U.S. oil industry from 1977 to 1994. Third, we employ ex ante measures of the threat of takeover at … the individual firm level which are superior to ex post measures like actual takeover occurrence or past incidence of …

Do shareholders of acquiring companies profit from acquisitions, or do acquiring CEOs overbidand destroy shareholder … value? Answering this question is difficult since the hypotheticalcounterfactual is hard to determine. We exploit merger … winningthe contest, the post-merger performance of the loser allows calculating the counterfactualperformance of the winner …