This paper develops a coherent theory of international co-operation relying on the twin assumptions of individual and collective rationality. Using a linear version of the N-player prisoners' dilemma game, I provide a formal proof of Olson's conjecture that only a "small" number of countries can...

A number of recent papers have found that certain measures of pollution worsen and later improve as income per head increases. It is widely believed that the downhill portion of this inverted-U curve reflects an induced policy response; that, as incomes rise, citizens demand improvements in...

International climate negotiations have thus far eschewed efforts to incorporate trade restrictions, but they have also failed to achieve their objective of reducing global emissions. Because of this failure, some countries are now inclined to act unilaterally and minilaterally, in many cases by...

I model the ocean as an array of lines set within a two-dimensional frame, and show how the Exclusive Economic Zone emerged as an equilibrium in customary international law. I find that custom codifies the efficient Nash equilibrium of enclosure for nearshore fisheries. For highly migratory and...

In this paper I examine the design of climate treaties when there exist two kinds of technology, a conventional abatement technology with (linearly) increasing marginal costs and a backstop technology ('air capture') with high but constant marginal costs. I focus on situations in which countries...

This paper explains why the approach taken so far to mitigate global climate change has failed. The central reason is an inability to enforce targets and timetables. Current proposals recommending even stricter emission limits will not help unless they are able to address the enforcement...

This paper explains why the approach taken so far to mitigate global climate change has failed. The central reason is an inability to enforce targets and timetables. Current proposals recommending even stricter emission limits will not help unless they are able to address the enforcement...

According to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, global collective action is needed to stabilize “greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous [our emphasis] anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” The Framework Convention thus...

Previous research shows that collective action to avoid a catastrophic threshold, such as a climate "tipping point," is unaffected by uncertainty about the impact of crossing the threshold but that collective action collapses if the location of the threshold is uncertain. Theory suggests that...