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Mediation in Situations of Conflict and Limited Commitment

Mitusch, Kay; Strausz, Roland - 2004

conflict of interest is positive but not too high. The value of mediation depends non-monotonically on the degree of conflict …We study the reasons and conditions under which mediation is beneficial when a principal needs information from an … mediator than through the agent himself. This implies that mediation is strictly helpful if and only if the likelihood of a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333731

Optimal Afforestation Contracts with Asymmetric information on Private Environmental Benefits

Anthon, Signe; Thorsen, Bo Jellesmark - 2004

We investigate the problem of subsidising afforestation when private information exists with respect to the level of private utility derived from the project. We develop a simple model that allows for an intelligent design of contracts when information is asymmetric. The model involves the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011324924

Venture Capital Contracts: A Survey of the Recent Literature

Schertler, Andrea - 2000

This paper surveys empirical and theoretical studies of various control mechanisms embedded in venture capital contracts. These mechanisms mitigate incentive problems and opportunistic behavior arising in the uncertain environment of financing young hightechnology enterprises that predominantly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010260452

Delegation and information revelation

Gautier, Axel; Paolini, Dimitri - 2000

be contracted for. With these simple contracts, we show that delegation is an alternative to contracting to elicit agent …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608611

Communicating Subjective Evaluations

Lang, Matthias - 2013

lenient and discriminate poorly between good performances. I show that this pattern is part of the optimal contract instead of … biased behavior. Furthermore, it is possible to implement the optimal contract in an ex-post budget-balanced way if …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010323871

Delegation and Information Revelation

Gautier, Axel; Paolini, Dimitri - 2002

This paper addresses the question of delegation in a partial contracting set-up, where only the control over actions is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263055

Incentive compability of dual transfer pricing

Carstens, Stefan; Weinem, Michael - 2000

We examine the implementation of efficient decisions about accepting a special order with asymmetric information by means of a dual transfer pricing mechanism based on Ronen and McKinney (1970). The model is designed in a simple fashion, two vertically related divisions within a firm...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010302269

On the non-contractual nature of donor-recipient interaction in development assistance

Murshed, S. Mansoob - 2008

This paper analyses three issues in strategic donor-recipient interaction motivated by the complexity of the rationale underlying aid. The first is when we have several principals with conflicting objectives. Any one principal cannot offer high powered incentives to the agent to carry out their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273524

Mediated audits

Pollrich, Martin - 2015

new light on the usefulness of mediation in contracting and on the design of optimal mechanisms. … each reported type the mediator randomizes over a base-contract and the audit contract, accompanied by a recommendation to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011350828

Testing for adverse selection into private medical insurance

Olivella, Pau; Vera-Hernandez, Marcos - 2006

We develop a test for adverse selection and use it to examine private health insurance markets. In contrast to earlier papers that consider a purely private system or a system in which private insurance supplements a public system, we focus our attention on a system where privately funded health...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010292988