the governance of international antitrust cases. Thus, lead jurisdiction models offer considerable economic benefits …

The paper discussed the economic theory of international antitrust institutions. Economic theory shows that non … of antitrust institutions and policies promotes dynamic and evolutionary efficiency so that globally binding, worldwide … homogenous competition rules do not represent a first-best solution either. After reviewing the existing international antitrust …

providing a cooperative forum for (mostly national) competition authorities from all around the world. In the absence of binding … global competition rules and antitrust laws, it attempts to coordinate national and supranational competition policies by …-based competition strategies partly differ from traditional standard economics and are still being developed in the academic world …

current world economic order, i.e. the supranational governance of private international restrictions to market competition … selection and appointment of appropriate lead jurisdictions for concrete cross-border antitrust cases, while the substantive … treatment remains within the competence of the existing national and regional-supranational antitrust regimes. …

current world economic order, i.e. the lack of supranational governance of private international restrictions to market … the selection and appointment of appropriate lead jurisdictions for concrete cross-border antitrust cases, while the … substantive treatment remains within the competence of the existing national and regional antitrust regimes. …

Institute for the World Economy and at the Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) for valuable comments on …

This paper is a contribution to the literature on rational design of trade agreements. The World Trade Organization …