I consider transactions involving asymmetric prisoners' dilemmas between pairs of players selected chosen from two large populations. Games are played repeatedly, but information about cheating is not adequate to sustain cooperation, and there is no official legal system of contract enforcement....

We consider the political economy of a monetary union wheremember governments attempt to influence the policy of the commoncentral bank. Modeling this as a common agency with incentivecontracts, we show that if incentives are all that matters for the bank,the equilibrium implements a weighted...

We examine the behavior of forward and spot exchange rates from the perspective of the representative agent theory of asset pricing. We verify that with moderate risk aversion and time-additive preferences the theory accounts for very little (by our calculations, less than 5 percent) of the...

We examine the possibility that nontraded goods may account for several striking features of international macroeconomic data: large, persistent deviations from purchasing power parity, small correlations of aggregate consumption fluctuations across countries, and substantial international real...

We explore the term structures of claims to a variety of cash flows: U.S. government bonds (claims to dollars), foreign government bonds (claims to foreign currency), inflation-adjusted bonds (claims to the price index), and equity (claims to future equity indexes or dividends). Average term...

Vortrag von Prof. Avinash K. Dixit Professor Emeritus of Economics, Princeton University

Failures of government policies often provoke opposite reactions from citizens; some call for a reversal of the policy while others favor its continuation in stronger form. We offer an explanation of such polarization, based on a natural bimodality of preferences in political and economic...

This paper analyzes the welfare implications of mandatory disclosure of losses at financial institutions when it is common knowledge that some banks have incurred losses but not which ones. We develop a model that features contagion, meaning that banks not hit by shocks may still suffer losses...