We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …

We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …

of complementary patents. In this context, we study how the allocation of bargaining power between principal and agents … completion, efficiency requires concentrating bargaining power in the principal. Strengthening the bargaining position of the … or discriminatory offers. When this collective action problem is severe enough, agents are better off when bargaining …

We present a legislative bargaining model of the provision of a durable public good over an infinite horizion. In each …

models of bargaining, to cooperative game-theoretic notions of the core, or notions of coalition-proofness in noncooperative …

We study dynamic committee bargaining over an infinite horizon with discounting. In each period a committee proposal is …

Committee voting has mostly been investigated from the perspective of the standard Baron-Ferejohn model of bargaining … over the division of a pie, in which bargaining ends as soon as the committee reaches an agreement. In standing committees …

We study a legislative bargaining game in which failure to agree in a given round may result in a breakdown of …