We theoretically and experimentally study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking … students' efforts in entrance exams. Students hold private information regarding their ability level that affects the cost of … their efforts. We assume that student preferences are homogeneous over colleges. By modeling college admissions as contests …

We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students' efforts in entrance exams …. Students' ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare the equilibria of 'centralized college … admissions' (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and 'decentralized college admissions' (DCA) where students only apply to …

We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students' efforts in entrance exams …. Students' ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare equilibria of “centralized college admissions …” (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and “decentralized college admissions” (DCA) where students only apply to one …

participation in the common (or unified) enrollment system leads to the most preferred outcome for students. Second, we show that …

Manipulability is a threat to the successful design of centralized matching markets. However, in many applications some …

students often fail to grasp the strategic issues involved. The modified SDA algorithm significantly improves the matching for …Quotas for special groups of students often apply in school or university admission procedures. This paper studies the … performance of two mechanisms to implement such quotas in a lab experiment. The first mechanism is a simplified version of the …

students often fail to grasp the strategic issues involved. The modified SDA algorithm significantly improves the matching for …Quotas for special groups of students often apply in school or university admission procedures. This paper studies the … performance of two mechanisms to implement such quotas in a lab experiment. The first mechanism is a simplified version of the …

students often fail to grasp the strategic issues involved. The modified SDA algorithm significantly improves the matching for …Quotas for special groups of students often apply in school or university admission procedures. This paper studies the … performance of two mechanisms to implement such quotas in a lab experiment. The first mechanism is a simplified version of the …

discriminates against students who are more loss averse or less confident than their peers, and amplifies already existing …

. We show that in problems where some students cannot credibly submit a single school as the only acceptable option, it is …