Similar Search Results

Ben-Yashar, Ruth; Danziger, Leif - 2014

the decision makers' posterior probabilities of a particular state of nature. Nevertheless, voting is generally an … voting mechanisms. The paper derives the conditions under which the optimal decision rule is equivalent to some well …-known voting procedure (weighted supermajority, weighted majority, and simple majority) and shows that these are very stringent …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010480812

When Is Voting Optimal?

Ben-Yashar, Ruth; Danziger, Leif - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010481601

Symmetric and asymmetric committees

Ben-Yashar, Ruth; Danziger, Leif - 2011

This paper studies the assignment of decision makers to two committees that make decisions by a simple majority rule. There is an even number of decision makers at each of various skill levels and each committee has an odd number of members. Surprisingly, even with the symmetric assumptions in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277358

Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities

Bochet, Olivier; Gordon, Sidartha - 2008

A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a profile of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number k of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not suffer from congestion and are non-excludable. We provide a characterization of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316052

The effect of limited search ability on the quality of competitive rent-seeking clubs

Nitzan, Shmuel; Kriesler, Kobi - 2010

A competitive rent-seeking club (CRSC) offers its members the chance of winning a prize (status, position, privilege) by being selected, typically, by a civil servant or a politician. The selector replaces in our setting the usual contest success function; instead of determining the winner on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010335991

Zur Manipulierbarkeit der Allokation öffentlicher Güter: Theoretische Analyse und Simulationsergebnisse

Lindner, Tobias - 2011

Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht die Aufteilung eines Budgets auf mehrere öffentliche Güter mittels einer Abstimmung … möglichen Präferenzen über Allokationen - es keine nicht manipulierbare Abstimmungsregel geben kann, wenn mehr als zwei …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011889538

Intra-group heterogeneity in collective contests

Nitzan, Shmuel; Ueda, Kaoru - 2013

Collective contests are examined permitting heterogeneity of stakes within every competing group. Our first concern is whether unequal distribution of stakes in a group can enhance its win probability. Our second concern is whether a large stake in a group can be individually disadvantageous. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291549

Single-crossing, strategic voting and the median choice rule

Saporiti, Alejandro; Tohmé, Fernando - 2003

-crossing preferences constitute a domain restriction on the real line that allows not only majority voting equilibria, but also non …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010323146

Arrow's impossibility theorem: Two simple single-profile versions

Feldman, Allan M.; Serrano, Roberto - 2006

In this short paper we provide two versions of Arrow’s impossibility theorem, in a world with only one preference profile. Both versions are extremely simple and allow a transparent understanding of Arrow’s theorem. The first version assumes a two-agent society; the second version, which is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318869

Arrow's impossibility theorem: Preference diversity in a single-profile world

Feldman, Allan M.; Serrano, Roberto - 2007

In this paper we provide a simple new version of Arrow’s impossibility theorem, in a world with only one preference profile. This theorem relies on a new assumption of preference diversity, and we explore alternative notions of preference diversity at length.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318976