Kolstad's (1994) model of intertemporal, competitive supply to a linear market from two distinct exhaustible resource deposits admits two different interior solutions - one with the low cost deposit 'earning' the higher resource rent and the other with the low cost deposit 'earning' the lower...

We set out a city as a price-taking exporter and importer with its own local structure (housing (land per household) and a local pure public good are produced endogenously). We impove labor efficiency in the export sector, observe a jump in the local wage, and trace the impact, particularly on...

We present an aggregate four good model (consumption, in- vestment and two government goods) in which the current .ows of one government good are in part pure public intermediate goods. The other public goods has 'final' services for households. We are interested in a benefit approach to...

We set out a simple four sector macro model of the economy of the Roman Empire during a period of considerable economic prosperity. Our focus is on gold coins as currency and the seignorage which the government used to fund its activities. We solve numerically for a balanced growth...

We set out and solve a static neoclassical model with a labor/leisure choice for agents and a government sector producing a Samuelsonian public good. Numerical solutions vary considerably with the elasticity of substitution for commodities in an agent's utility function. We focus on solutions...

We set out a small, open economy model of a city, one with local housing, government production and a non-traded good. We observe that a positive shift in labor productivity in the export sector generally results in a larger, higher-wage and more densely settled city. Production of the local...

We take up the hypothesis that risk premiums on equities are embodying the costs incurred by equity holders in monitoring the firms which they have invested in. This idea is a key ingredient in our construction of a two sector neoclassical model with widget producing firms and commercial banks....

In each period, we have an R&D race among N competitive R&D firms, each with probability π of discovering a successful new technique for producing an intermediate good used in producing the economy's final consumption good. The winner of a race earns a monopoly profit over a generally uncertain...

Each extractor has a distinct quadratic extraction cost and faces a linear industry demand schedule. We observe that the open loop and closed loop solutions are the same if initial stocks are such that each competitor is extracting in every period in which her competitors are extracting.

We consider costly administration at the center of a farming community surrounding a fortified village. Land rent taxation is high cost mode of financing central administration in a tax incidence sense. Participatory administration by the governed is a lower cost alternative. We speculate why...