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Government-sponsored microfinance program: Joint liability vs. individual liability

Mukherjee, Arghya Kusum; Kundu, Amit - In: Cogent Economics & Finance 2 (2014) 1, pp. 1-14

Swarnajayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY) is a government-sponsored microfinance program. The scheme is based on four … features: group lending with joint liability, progressive lending, back-ended subsidy, and social capital. We propose a new … model of SGSY having these features: group lending with individual liability, progressive lending, back-ended subsidy, and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011559127

Characterizing core stability with fuzzy games

Shellshear, Evan - 2009

This paper investigates core stability of cooperative, TU games via a fuzzy extension of the totally balanced cover of a TU game. The stability of the core of the fuzzy extension of a game, the concave extension, is shown to reflect the core stability of the original game and vice versa....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272595

An Axiomatization of the Banzhaf Value for Cooperative Games on Antimatroids

Algaba, E.; Bilbao, J.M.; van den Brink, R.; … - 2002

Cooperative games on antimatroids are cooperative games restricted by a combinatorial structure which generalize the permission structure. So, cooperative games on antimatroids group several well-known families of games which have important applications in economics and politics. Therefore, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324827

The Average Tree Solution for Cooperative Games with Communication Structure

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; van der Laan, Gerard; Talman, Dolf - 2008

We study cooperative games with communication structure, represented by an undirected graph. Players in the game are able to cooperate only if they can form a network in the graph. A single-valued solution, the average tree solution, is proposed for this class of games. Given the graph structure...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325870

Share Functions for Cooperative Games with Levels Structure of Cooperation

Alvarez-Mozos, Mikel; van den Brink, Rene; van der … - 2012

In a standard TU-game it is assumed that every subset of the player set can form a coalition and earn its worth. One of the first models where restrictions in cooperation are considered is the one of games with coalition structure. In such games the player set is partitioned into unions and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326205

On the Core of Cost-Revenue Games: Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Games with Revenues

Estevez-Fernandez, Arantza; Reijnierse, Hans - 2012

In this paper, we analyze cost sharing problems arising from a general service by explicitly taking into account the generated revenues. To this cost-revenue sharing problem, we associate a cooperative game with transferable utility, called cost-revenue game. By considering cooperation among the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326323

Consistency, Monotonicity and Implementation of Egalitarian Shapley Values

van den Brink, René; Funaki, Yukihiko; Ju, Yuan - 2007

One of the main issues in economics is the trade-off between marginalism and egalitarianism. In the context of cooperative games this trade-off can be framed as one of choosing to allocate according to the Shapley value or the equal division solution. In this paper we provide tools that make it...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325573

Axiomatization and Implementation of Discounted Shapley Values

van den Brink, Rene; Funaki, Yukihiko - 2010

We generalize the null player property (satisfied by the Shapley value) and nullifying player property (satisfied by the equal division solution) to the so-called delta-reducing player property, stating that a delta-reducing player (being a player such that any coalition containing this player...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326064

Allocation Rules for Network Games

Jackson, Matthew O. - 2003

Previous allocation rules for network games, such as the Myerson Value, implicitly or explicitly take the network structure as fixed. In many situations, however, the network structure can be altered by players. This means that the value of alternative network structures (not just sub-networks)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325073

On the stability of cooperation structures

Haeringer, Guillaume - 2002

This paper studies the payoff structure of stable cooperation structures in link formation games. Players choose non-cooperatively with whom they want to form a link, and the payoffs are given by the Myerson value of the cooperation structure obtained. We characterize the class of TU-games that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335692