This paper investigates the impact of price transparency on equilibrium prices and fees by considering a policy change implemented by Airbnb that affected the transparency of cleaning fees for IP addresses from the European Union (EU). Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find a...

In this paper, we consider two platforms that compete for the development of a new product to integrate into their ecosystems. The new product can be developed either inhouse by the platforms or by an independent startup active only in the technology market. The presence of the startup affects...

Große digitale Plattformen wie Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google und Microsoft haben die technischen Möglichkeiten, umfangreiche Daten ihrer NutzerInnen zu sammeln. Beim Surfen im Internet kann dies durch das Laden kleinerer Programme und Identifikatoren wie Cookies geschehen, die das Beobachten...

Does employers' association (EA) membership affect the wages paid by firms? Such effects could follow from several channels, including increased productivity, different management practices, or employer collusion promoted by EA affiliation. We test these hypotheses drawing on detailed matched...

How do incentives to collude depend on how asymmetric firms are? In many markets product quality is an important parameter that determines firms' market strategies. We study collusion in a quality-differentiated duopoly and we adopt a Nash bargaining approach to compute the collusive equilibrium...

Digital platforms facilitate interactions between consumers and merchants that allow collection of profiling information, which drives innovation and welfare. Private incentives, however, lead to information asymmetries resulting in market failures both on-platform, among merchants, and...

The controversy around the breakaway European Super League, set to conquer the UEFA Champions League, and the surrounding antitrust proceedings revive the academic discussion about the monopoly power of sport-internal governing bodies (like the UEFA), the justification for and limits of their...

We study the incentives of firms that hold partial vertical ownership to foreclose rivals. Compared to a full vertical merger, with partial ownership, a firm may obtain only part of the target's profit but may nevertheless be able to influence the target's strategy significantly. The target may...

The European Commission has proposed a new regulatory tool for the governance of digital markets. The Digital Markets Act (DMA) intents to limit the market behavior of socalled gatekeeper companies to ensure contestable and fair digital markets. We review the provisions of the DMA both from a...

We evaluate the impact of competition on investments in Europe's mobile communications market during the 2011-2021 period. There are stark and sustained differences in market outcomes between three- and four-player markets in Europe, and economic theory suggests these could be partly explained...