We investigate a random proposer bargaining game with a dead line. A bounded time interval is divided into bargaining … periods of equal length and we study the limit of the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome as the number of bargaining periods …

, 1953) for two-person bargaining games. Three of these axioms are standard and are shared by several popular bargaining … solutions. They suffice to characterize these solutions on TU-bargaining games where they coincide. The fourth axiom is a … of Nash's IIA-axiom that together with the three standard axioms suffices to characterize the Nash bargaining solution …

This article provides an exact non-cooperative foundation of the sequential Raiffa solution for two person bargaining … games. Based on an approximate foundation due to Myerson (1997) for any two-person bargaining game (S,d) an extensive form …

Concessions try to avoid conflict in bargaining and can finally lead to an agreement. Although they usually are seen as … attempts. We experimentally compare three protocols of concession bargaining, the normal form or static one, the one where …

This paper uses the example of an exam to model multi-dimensional search under a deadline. When the dimension is two … sensitive to changes in the deadline, and a wide variety of policies can be rationalized (as being optimal) as the length of the … deadline increases. This is contrasted with behavior under the traditional case of geometric discounting, in which a similar …

We show that a steeply increasing workload before a deadline is compatible with time-consistent preferences. The key …

-based shipment promises for stochastic deadline-oriented order fulfilment processes in warehouses. We present a discrete-time Markov …

the class of pure bargaining games. Our result corrects an error in Roth (Econometrica 46:587–594, 983, 1978) and … generalizes Roth’s result to bargaining games with arbitrary status quo. …

Consider a model of bargaining, in which two players, 1 and 2, share a pie of size y. The bargaining environment is … adopt a Nash bargaining solution, we investigate the empirical content of this assumption. We first show that in the most …-specific, in the sense that [lamda]i does not influence the utility or the threat point of player j Æ i, then Nash bargaining …