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A Dynamic Analysis of the Demand for Health Insurance and Health Care

Bolhaar, Jonneke; Lindeboom, Maarten; van der Klaauw, Bas - 2008

We investigate the presence of moral hazard and advantageous or adverse selection in a market for supplementary health insurance. For this we specify and estimate dynamic models for health insurance decisions and health care utilization. Estimates of the health care utilization models indicate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325874

Credence goods, costly diagnosis, and subjective evaluation

Bester, Helmut; Dahm, Matthias - 2014

We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low-cost service is sufficient or whether a high-cost treatment is required to solve the consumer's problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444292

Delegation and Interim Performance Evaluation

Schütte, Miriam; Wichardt, Philipp Christoph - 2013

This paper considers the effects of an interim performance evaluation on the decision of a principal to delegate authority to a potentially biased but better informed agent. Assuming the agents’ outside option to be determined by market beliefs about their type, interim evaluations (a) provide...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293918

Bayesian Repeated Games and Reputations

Forges, Francoise; Salomon, Antoine - 2014

equilibria share some features with the ones of multi-sided reputation models. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010352382

Timing of predictions in dynamic cheap talk: Experts vs. quacks

Smirnov, Aleksei; Starkov, Egor - 2019

of privately known competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of the forecast regarding the outcome …. Further, any report hurts the forecaster's reputation in the short run, with later reports incurring larger penalties. The … reputation of a silent forecaster, on the other hand, gradually improves over time. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012140661

Trust and Reputation under Asymmetric Information

Janas, Moritz; Oljemark, Emilia - 2020

We study the role of information about the multiplier in a finitely repeated investment game. A high multiplier increases the reputational incentives of a trustee, leading to more repayments. Our perfect Bayesian equilibrium analysis shows that if the trustee is privately informed about the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012287806

Trust and betrayals: Reputational payoffs and behaviors without commitment

Pei, Harry - In: Theoretical Economics 16 (2021) 2, pp. 449-475

I study a repeated game in which a patient player wants to win the trust of some myopic opponents but can strictly benefit from betraying them. His benefit from betrayal is strictly positive and is his persistent private information. I characterize every type of patient player's highest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189075

The forward-looking disclosures of corporate managers: Theory and evidence

Gropp, Reint E.; Karapandza, Rasa; Opferkuch, Julian - 2016

We consider an infinitely repeated game in which a privately informed, long-lived manager raises funds from short-lived investors in order to finance a project. The manager can signal project quality to investors by making a (possibly costly) forward-looking disclosure about her project's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011504361

The forward-looking disclosures of corporate managers: Theory and evidence

Gropp, Reint E.; Karapandza, Rasa; Opferkuch, Julian - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011507306

Delegation in long-term relationships

Schütte, Miriam; Wichardt, Philipp C. - 2012

This paper considers the e effcts of a two-period interaction on the decision of a principal to delegate authority to a potentially biased but better informed agent. Compared to the (repeated) one-period case, the agent's first period actions may also signal his type which in turn impacts wages...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010287567