La France est-elle prête pour une réforme électorale majeure ? Entre proportionnelle et scrutinmajoritaire, les enjeux de représentation et de gouvernabilité s’entrechoquent.

We argue in favor of a departure from the standard equilibrium approach in game theory in favor of the less ambitious goal of describing only the actual behavior of rational players. We investigate the notion of rationality in behavioral models of extensive-form games (allowing for imperfect...

We provide a new characterization of AGM belief revision in terms of a Kripke-Stalnaker-Lewis semantics. We consider pointed frames consisting of a set of states, a distinguished state interpreted as the actual state, a Kripke belief relation and a Stalnaker-Lewis selection function. Adding a...

We provide a new characterization of both belief update and belief revision in terms of a Kripke-Lewis semantics. We consider frames consisting of a set of states, a Kripke belief relation and a Lewis selection function. Adding a valuation to a frame yields a model. Given a model and a state, we...

This is the first draft of a chapter in a planned book on the Prisoner's Dilemma, edited by Martin Peterson, to be published by Cambridge University Press. It discusses the nature of the conditionals involved in deliberation, taking the Prisoner's Dilemma game as point of departure.

We investigate the extension of backward-induction to von Neumann extensive games (where information sets have a synchronous structure) and provide an epistemic characterization of it. Extensions of the idea of backward-induction were proposed by Penta (2009) and later by Perea (2013), who also...

Johan van Benthem has highlighted in his work that many questions arising in the analysis of strategic interaction call for logical and computational analysis. These questions lead to both formal and conceptually illuminating answers, in that they contribute to clarifying some of the underlying...

The temporal updating of an agent's beliefs in response to a flow of information is modeled in a simple modal logic that, for every date t , contains a normal belief operator B_t and a non-normal information operator I_t which is analogous to the 'only knowing' operator discussed in the computer...

It is natural to think of belief revision as the interaction of belief and information over time. Thus branching-time temporal logic seems a natural setting for a theory of belief revision. We propose two extensions of a modal logic that, besides the next-time temporal operator, contains a...

We consider strategic-form games with ordinal payoffs and provide a syntactic analysis of common belief/knowledge of rationality, which we define axiomatically. Two axioms are considered. The first says that a player is irrational if she chooses a particular strategy while believing that another...