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Horan, Sean - In: Theoretical Economics 16 (2021) 1, pp. 235-274

Despite the wide variety of agendas used in legislative settings, the literature on sophisticated voting has focused on two formats, the so-called Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas. In the current paper, I introduce a broad class of agendas whose defining structural features,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013188992

Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu-Hurwicz equilibrium

Haake, Claus-Jochen; Trockel, Walter - 2021

and Sonnenschein (1975) that also generalizes the dcmechanism of Koray and Yildiz (2018) which relates implementation via … mechanisms with implementation via rights structures as introduced by Sertel (2001). In the second part we apply and illustrate … provide in a socio-legal system based on Nash's demand game an implementation of the Nash bargaining solution in Debreu …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012606400

Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium

Haake, Claus-Jochen; Trockel, Walter - In: Review of Economic Design 26 (2021) 4, pp. 635-649

implementation via mechanisms with implementation via rights structures as introduced by Sertel (Designing rights: invisible hand … provide in a socio-legal system based on Nash’s demand game an implementation of the Nash bargaining solution in Debreu …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014497503

Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments

Healy, Paul J.; Mathevet, Laurent - In: Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) 3, pp. 609-661

We study the design of mechanisms that implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations and whose Nash equilibria are dynamically stable for a wide class of adaptive dynamics. We argue that supermodularity is not a desirable stability criterion in this mechanism design context, focusing instead on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599472

Renegotiation-proof mechanism design

Neeman, Zvika; Pavlov, Gregory - 2010

We study a mechanism design problem under the assumption that renegotiation cannot be prevented. We investigate what kind of equilibria of which mechanisms are renegotiation-proof under a variety of renegotiation procedures, and which social choice functions can be implemented in a way that is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291988

Procedurally Fair Implementation: The Cost of Insisting on Symmetry

Ville, Korpela - 2016

We derive a necessary and a sufficient condition for Nash implementation with a procedurally fair mechanism. Our result …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012503061

Social Choice Theory: A Neglected Path to Possibility

Ville, Korpela - 2016

Often preferences of agents are such that any sensible goal of the collective must admit a tie between all alternatives. The standard formulation in mechanism design demand that in this case all alternatives are equilibrium outcomes of the social choice mechanism. However, as far as the idea of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012503063

Implementation with farsighted agents

Korpela, Ville; Lombardi, Michele; Vartiainen, Hannu - 2021

questions of implementation theory under complete information in a setting with transfers, where farsighted coalitions are … for implementation in general, we show that every monotonic social choice rule can be implemented. These findings imply …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012503093

An Implementation Approach to Rotation Programs

Korpela, Ville; Lombardi, Michele; Saulle, Riccardo D. - 2021

common-pool resources, and rotation procedures in fair division problems. We study rotation programs via the implementation … between two consecutive states. We provide characterizing conditions for the implementation in rotation programs and show that …, for multi-valued rules, our notion of rotation monotonicity is necessary and sufficient for implementation. Finally, we …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012605973

A constitutional theory of the family

Cigno, Alessandro - 2005

The paper re-examines the idea that a family can be viewed as a community governed by a self-enforcing constitution, and extends existing results in two directions. First, it identifies circumstances in which a constitution is renegotiation-proof. Second, it introduces parental altruism. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267482