This paper studies an exchange economy with indivisibilities. Our main goal is to see if a price system can function well in an economy (e.g., an economy with complementary preferences) that does not have a Walrasian equilibrium. We study the price adjustment processes governed by the Euler...

This paper studies the English (progressive) auction for an exchange economy with multiple objects. The English auction is a tatonnement process and lasts multiple rounds. It is modeled as a sequence of round games. Each round game is a normal form game in which an agent's strategies are his...

Consider a society with a finite number of individuals. A coalition structure is a partition of the set of individuals. Each individual has personal preferences over the set of all coalition structures. We study the strategy proof core and von Neumann and Morgenstern (vN&M) solutions. A roommate...

Roth and Vande Vate (1991) studied the marriage problem and introduced the notion of truncation strategies and showed in an example that the unstable matchings can arise at Nash equilibria in truncations. This paper studies the college admissions problem and shows that all rematching proof or...

This paper studies a production economy with indivisibilities. We provide a characterization for all Walraian equilibria and a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of Walrasian equilibrium. We find a sufficient condition for every descening (ascending) price process to converge...

This paper studies an exchange economy with a finite number of agents in which each agent is initially endowed with a finite number of (personalized) indivisible commodities. We observe that the core equivalence theorem may not hold for this economy when the coalitional form game is generated in...

Consider a society with a finite number of players. Each player has personal preferences over coalitions in which he joints. A social outcome is a coalition structure that is defined by a partition of the set of players. We study the strategy proof core and von Neumann and Morgenstern (vN&M)...

This paper studies the job matching market in Kelso and Crawford(1982) with one exception that co-workers may generate utility or disutility in the workplace. We provide a simple idea to show how a great number of sufficient condiions for a nonempty core in the literature can be extended to this...

Both rematching proof and strong equilibrium outcomes are stable with respect to the true preferences in the marriage problem. We show that not all rematching proof or strong equilibrium outcomes are stable in the college admissions problem. But we show that both rematching proof and strong...