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Morath, Florian; Münster, Johannes - 2009

This paper considers incentives for information acquisition ahead of conflicts. We characterize the (unique) equilibrium of the all-pay auction between two players with one-sided asymmetric information. The type of one player is common knowledge. The type of the other player is drawn from a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010306972

Information acquisition in conflicts

Morath, Florian; Münster, Johannes - 2010

This paper considers incentives for information acquisition ahead of conflicts. First, we characterize the (unique) equilibrium of the all-pay auction between two players with one-sided asymmetric information where one player has private information about his valuation. Then, we use ou rresults...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334005

A note on the exclusion principle

Bertoletti, Paolo - 2005

According to the so-called Exclusion Principle (introduced by Baye et alii, 1993), it might be profitable for the seller to reduce the number of (fullyinformed) potential bidders in an all-pay auction. We show that the Exclusion Principle does not apply if the seller regards the bidders' private...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326123

Optimal Seedings in Elimination Tournaments

Groh, Christian; Moldovanu, Benny; Sela, Aner; Sunde, Uwe - 2003

We study an elimination tournament with heterogenous contestants whose ability is common-knowledge. Each pair-wise match is modeled as an all-pay auction where the winner gets the right to compete at the next round. Equilibrium efforts are in mixed strategies, yielding rather complex play...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333743

All-pay auctions: Implementation and optimality

Jönsson, Stefan; Schmutzler, Armin - 2013

This paper analyzes how all-pay auctions with endogenous prizes can be used to provide effort incentives. We show that … losers. All-pay auctions with endogenous prizes can do better than all-pay auctions with fixed prizes in this respect, in … particular, when the prize function is approximately linear. We use the results to compare patents and prizes as innovation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316920

Silent interests and all-pay auctions

Konrad, Kai A. - 2005

If firms compete in all-pay auctions with complete information, silent shareholdings introduce asymmetric externalities into the all-pay auction framework. If the strongest firm owns a large share in the second strongest firm, this may make the strongest firm abstain from bidding. As a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261198

Silent Interests and All-Pay Auctions

Konrad, Kai A. - 2005

If firms compete in all-pay auctions with complete information, silent shareholdings introduce asymmetric externalities into the allpay auction framework. If the strongest firm owns a large share in the second strongest firm, this may make the strongest firm abstain from bidding. As a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010296367

Silent interests and all-pay auctions

Konrad, Kai Andreas - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333027

On the reserve price in all-pay auctions with complete information and lobbying games

Bertoletti, Paolo - 2005

We study the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information and a reserve price, and compare it with that of standard auctions. The seller should set a reserve price even when she faces incomplete information. In the latter setting, ex-ante asymmetry among bidders appears necessary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326088

Jump bidding and budget constraints in all-pay auctions and wars of attrition

Dekel, Eddie; Jackson, Matthew O.; Wolinsky, Asher - 2007

We study all-pay auctions (or wars of attrition), where the highest bidder wins an object, but all bidders pay their bids. We consider such auctions when two bidders alternate in raising their bids and where all aspects of the auction are common knowledge including bidders.valuations. We analyze...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266326