Microwave spectrum has been the primary solution for the rapid and cost-effective rollout of mobile backhaul infrastructure. Most of the mobile sites worldwide today are connecting via Microwave (MW) or Millimeter Wave (mmW) radio links. The evolution from 4G towards 5G presents significant...

The 'Climate action and renewable energy package' proposed by the European Commission in the beginning of 2008 suggests auctioning as basic principle for allocation for the upcoming third trading phase of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme that runs from 2013 to 2020. Overall, it is estimated that...

How should we select winning bids of generation units for strategic reserves that consist of capacity bids and energy bids? In this paper, we analyze two selecting mechanisms (scoring rules): "simultaneous" and "sequential". In case of a simultaneous scoring rule, capacity and energy bids are...

Agents' valuations are interdependent if they depend on the signals of all agents. Previous literature has claimed that with interdependent valuations and multidimen-sional, but independent, signals, efficient auction design is impossible. This paper shows that, on the contrary, it is always...

Despite negative experiences with auctioning off subsidies for renewable energy in some countries, tenders are increasingly used today. We develop a reverse auction which accounts for particularities of intermittent renewable energy sources. Determining the quantity, demanded by the regulator,...

Efficient renewables deployment requires the minimisation of both internal generation costs and external transmission expansion planning (TEP) costs. Competitive pay-as-bid connection auctions allow wind energy generators to reveal their costs of generation such that internal generation costs...

There is an ongoing debate on the appropriate auction design for competitive electricity balancing markets. Uniform (UPA)and discriminatory price auctions (DPA), the prevalent designs in use today, are assumed to have different properties with regard to prices and effciencies. These properties...

This paper considers an auction design framework in which bidders get partial feedback about the distribution of bids submitted in earlier auctions: either bidders are asymmetric but past bids are disclosed in an anonymous way or several auction formats are being used and the distribution of...

In a lab experiment, we analyze the benefits of increasing competition on auction platforms hosting multiple auctioneers of a homogeneous good. We find that increasing competition by merging separated individual auctions increases market efficiency and also buyers' payoffs, while there is no...

If bidders are better informed than the seller about a common component of auction heterogeneity, the seller can allocate more efficiently by keeping her reserve price secret and revising it using submitted bids. We build a model of a first-price auction under unobserved auction...