risk. By introducing default-dependent borrowing constraints, we show the existence of equilibrium. …

possible to account for equilibrium constraints and to evaluate the effects of exogenous labour demand shocks. We consider two …

-specific inputs in production. In an equilibrium model of the U.S. labor market, we examine the responses of employment and wages to …

turning to models of the consumer, the producer, and monopoly. Part II (Chapters 8-14) introduces the concept of equilibrium … an exchange economy, equilibrium with rational expectations, and an economy with asymmetric information. Part III … equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium. Part IV (Chapters 17-20) gives a taste of the topics of mechanism design, matching …

turning to models of the consumer, the producer, and monopoly. Part II (Chapters 8-14) introduces the concept of equilibrium … an exchange economy, equilibrium with rational expectations, and an economy with asymmetric information. Part III … equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium. Part IV (Chapters 17-20) gives a taste of the topics of mechanism design, matching …

sole and strict pure strategy Nash equilibrium, being that of strategies no vaccination and no imposition, respectively … transforms the Nash equilibrium into that of strategies vaccination and direct imposition, respectively, as materially come to … pure strategy Nash equilibrium, either in strategies vaccination and direct imposition or in strategies revolution and …

turning to models of the consumer, the producer, and monopoly. Part II (Chapters 8-14) introduces the concept of equilibrium … an exchange economy, equilibrium with rational expectations, and an economy with asymmetric information. Part III … equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium. Part IV (Chapters 17-20) gives a taste of the topics of mechanism design, matching …

turning to models of the consumer, the producer, and monopoly. Part II (Chapters 8-14) introduces the concept of equilibrium … an exchange economy, equilibrium with rational expectations, and an economy with asymmetric information. Part III … equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium. Part IV (Chapters 17-20) gives a taste of the topics of mechanism design, matching …