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In financial markets, professional traders leverage their trades because it allows to trade larger positions with less margin. Violating margin requirements, however, triggers a margin call and open positions are automatically covered until requirements are met again. What impact does margin...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291801
Decision makers often take risky decisions on the behalf of others rather than for themselves. Competing theoretical models predict both, higher as well as lower levels of risk aversion when taking risk for others, and the experimental evidence is mixed. In our within-subject design, money...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010520538
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This paper analyzes the coordination challenge a partial cartel faces when payoff asymmetries between potential cartel insiders and potential cartel outsiders are large. We introduce two experimental treatments: a standard treatment where a complete cartel can be supported in a Nash equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014501600
This paper analyzes in a large-scale field experiment (N = 1425) whether gift vouchers stimulate the use of a demand responsive transportation (DRT) system. This scenario is compared to a situation where customers receive environmental certificates, which report the saved carbon dioxide as a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014501973
We analyze competition between workers in a gift-exchange experiment where two workers are hired by the same employer. In the competition treatment the two employees simultaneously choose their effort whereas in the baseline treatment competition cannot occur since there is only one employee per...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010308911
This paper provides experimental evidence on the formation of partial cartels with endogenous coordination. Firms face a coordination challenge when a partial cartel is to be formed as every firm is better off if it is not inside the cartel but is a free-riding outsider. We introduce a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010311835
We analyze dictator allocation decisions in an experiment where the recipients have to earn the pot to be divided with a real-effort task. As the recipients move before the dictators, their effort decisions resemble the first move in a trust game. Depending on the recipients' performance, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010305857
This paper experimentally analyzes the cartel coordination challenge induced by the discrimination of cartel ringleaders in leniency policies. Ringleaders often take a leading role in the coordination and formation of a cartel. A leniency policy which grants amnesty to all whistleblowers except...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010328002