Showing 1 - 10 of 18
We theoretically and experimentally analyze the role of verifiability and privacy in strategic performance feedback using a 'one principal-two agent' context with real effort. We confirm the theoretical prediction that information transmission occurs only in verifiable feedbackmechanisms and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011440134
FeedbackWe theoretically and experimentally analyze public and private feedback in teams that are characterized by different performance technologies. We consider a setting where the principal can provide truthful information on agents' performances or strategically withhold feedback. We find...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012060196
The canonical bargaining game in economics is the ultimatum game, played by tens of thousands of students around the world over the past three decades. In the ultimatum game, first studied by Werner Guth, Rolf Schmittberger, and Bernd Schwarze (1982), the “proposer” proposes how to split a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012142368
The open science movement has gained significant momentum over the past decade, with pre-registration and the use of pre-analysis plans being central to ongoing debates. Combining observational evidence on trends in adoption with survey data from 519 researchers, this study examines the adoption...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015358810
The open science movement has gained significant momentum over the past decade, with pre-registration and the use of pre-analysis plans being central to ongoing debates. Combining observational evidence on trends in adoption with survey data from 519 researchers, this study examines the adoption...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015409265
It is well known that non-renegotiable contracts with third parties may have an effect on the outcome of a strategic interaction and thus serve as a commitment device. We address this issue when contracts are renegotiable. More precisely, we analyze the equilibrium outcomes of twostage games...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273661
We model the settlement of a legal dispute where the trial outcome depends on the behavior of a strategically motivated judge. We consider a standard asymmetric information model where the uninformed defendant makes a take it or leave it offer. If the case goes to trial, the judge decides how...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010500186
This paper characterizes the equilibrium outcomes of two-stage games in which the second mover has private information and can sign renegotiable contracts with a neutral third-party. Our aim is to understand whether renegotiation-proof third-party contracts can confer a strategic advantage on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010500203
This paper characterizes equilibrium outcomes of extensive form games with incomplete information in which players can sign renegotiable contracts with third-parties. Our aim is to understand the extent to which third-party contracts can be used as commitment devices when it is impossible to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010500254
We analyze delegation of a set of decisions over time by an informed principal to a potentially biased agent. Each period the principal observes a state of the world and sends a 'cheap-talk' message to the agent, who is privately informed about her bias. We focus on principal-optimal equilibria...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011696314