We review, and extend, one of the classic dynamic models of conflict in economics by Richardson (1919) and Boulding (1962). Restrictions on parameters are relaxed to account for alliances and for peace-keeping, yielding new dynamic patterns of conflict. In addition, we explore an incrementalist...

Gegenstand dieses Beitrags ist ein allgemeines lineares dynamisches Konfliktmodell, welches viele bekannte Modelle als Spezialfälle enthält. Die stationären Punkte und die möglichen dynamischen Muster (asymptotische Stabilität) in diesem Modell werden allgemein charakterisiert und die...

We review, and extend, one of the classic dynamic models of conflict in economics by Richardson (1919) and Boulding (1962). It turns out that the stability properties of the model change if one takes a more realistic 'incrementalist' view, and that chance / friction can easily be incorporated...

Wir illustrieren den Einsatz von Simulationstechniken zur Betrachtung komplexer Dynamiken in asymmetrischen Konfliktsituationen mit begrenzt rationalen Akteuren. Dazu wird erst ein formaler Modellrahmen entwickelt, dessen Steady state wir bestimmen. Darauf baut eine Umsetzung des Modells in...

We take issue with the argument expounded, among others, by Layard (2006, Economic Journal) that status-seeking preferences justify heavier taxation of income because this serves to internalise the negative externality that the pursuit of status imposes on others. In a model where status depends...

We introduce public signals and cognitive dissonance into the standard Allingham-Sandmo-Yitzhaki (ASY) model of tax evasion. It turns out that the presence of cognitive dissonanceattenuates tax evasion as individuals dislike allowing their true bevhaviour to diverge from their public statement...

Using examples for each type of model, we consider dynamic games, differential games, and simulation as alternative ways of extending the standard static economic model of conflict to study patterns of conflict dynamics. It turns out that computational requirements and theoretical difficulties...

The present paper proposes a myopic, boundedly rational heuristic for individual decision-making in differential game settings. I demonstrate that this type of behaviour converges to Nash equilibrium in infinitely repeated stage games without a state variable if the stage game is strategically...

Dieser Beitrag untersucht den Begriff der Initiative in Strategie und operativer Kunst aus spieltheoretischer Perspektive. Wir modellieren dazu den Unterschied zwischen den beiden Wirkmechanismen der Initiative: der Einflussnahme auf gegnerisches Verhalten zum einen und der Beschneidung der...

Using a new data set that captures the share of reporting on terrorism, we explore the nexus between terrorist attacks and the news. It turns out that terrorism mainly influences news reports through the number of incidents. Regarding the reverse causality, we provide evidence that the share of...