We establish that the effect of intensified deposit market competition, measured by reduced switching costs, on the probability of bank failures depends critically on whether we focus on competition with established customer relationships or competition for the formation of such relationships....

This paper studies whether and how banks' technological innovations affect the bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission. We first provide a theoretical model in which banks' technological innovation relaxes firms' earning-based bor rowing constraints and thereby enlarges the response...

This paper studies whether and how banks' technological innovations affect the bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission. We first provide a theoretical model in which banks' technological innovation relaxes firms' earning-based borrowing constraints and thereby enlarges the response...

We study a competitive banking sector in which banks choose the level of risk of their asset portfolios and, upon the public disclosure of stress test results, raise funding by promising investors a repayment. We show that competition forces banks to choose risky assets so as to promise...

We analyze the topical question of how the compensation of elected politicians affects the set of citizens choosing to run. To this end, we develop a sparse and tractable citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with ability differences, informative campaigning and political parties....

We analyze the topical question of how the compensation of elected politicians affects the set of citizens choosing to run. To this end, we develop a sparse and tractable citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with ability differences, informative campaigning and political parties....

Economic interest in innovation policy largely arises from the fundamental importance of innovation to social welfare and from well-known inefficiencies in innovation in a competitive market environment. As a result, a wide variety of public innovation policies are used in practice. This report...

We study the optimal duration of contracts in a principal-agent framework with both moral hazard and adverse selection. Agents decide on a contract-specific and non-verifiable investment. Incentive compatibility requires that initial contracts, which serve to screen the ability of newly hired...

Transparency regulation aims at reducing financial fragility by strengthening market discipline.There are however two elementary properties of banking that may render such regulation inefficient at best and detrimental at worst.First, an extensive financial safety net may eliminate the...

Although it is widely acknowledged that the benefits of corporate governance reform could be substantial, systematic evidence on such reforms is scant.We both document and evaluate a contemporary corporate governance reform by constructing 18 measures of shareholder and creditor protection for...