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Iterative versus standard deferred acceptance: Experimental evidence

Bó, Inácio; Hakimov, Rustamdjan - 2016

the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism versus the Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (IDAM), a matching …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011574203

Implementing quotas in university admissions: An experimental analysis

Braun, Sebastian; Dwenger, Nadja; Kübler, Dorothea; … - 2012

students often fail to grasp the strategic issues involved. The modified SDA algorithm significantly improves the matching for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307931

Implementing quotas in university admissions: An experimental analysis

Braun, Sebastian; Dwenger, Nadja; Kübler, Dorothea; … - 2012

students often fail to grasp the strategic issues involved. The modified SDA algorithm significantly improves the matching for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281521

Implementing quotas in university admissions: An experimental investigation

Braun, Sebastian; Dwenger, Nadja; Kübler, Dorothea; … - 2012

students often fail to grasp the strategic issues involved. The modified SDA algorithm significantly improves the matching for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286341

Incentives in matching markets: counting and comparing manipulating agents

Bonkoungou, Somouaoga; Nesterov, Alexander - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 3, pp. 965-991

Manipulability is a threat to the successful design of centralized matching markets. However, in many applications some …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536989

School choice and loss aversion

Meisner, Vincent; von Wangenheim, Jonas - 2019

Extensive evidence suggests that participants in the direct student-proposing deferred-acceptance mechanism (DSPDA) play dominated strategies. In particular, students with low priority tend to misrepresent their preferences for popular schools. To explain the observed data, we introduce...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012290339

School Choice and Loss Aversion

Meisner, Vincent; von Wangenheim, Jonas - 2021

Evidence suggests that participants in direct student-proposing deferred-acceptance mechanisms (DA) play dominated strategies. To explain the data, we introduce expectation-based loss aversion into a school-choice setting and characterize choice-acclimating personal equilibria in DA. We find...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012799779

Everyone Likes to Be Liked: Experimental Evidence from Matching Markets

Opitz, Timm; Schwaiger, Christoph - 2023

Matching markets can be unstable when individuals prefer to be matched to a partner who also wants to be matched with … preferences exist, significantly decrease stability in matching markets, and are driven both by belief-based and preference …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014467870

Kidney Exchange over the Blood Group Barrier

Andersson, Tommy; Kratz, Jörgen - 2016

Medical technology making kidney transplantation over the blood group barrier possible is now a reality. This paper investigates how such technology should be implemented when designing pairwise kidney exchange programs. The possibility to receive a kidney transplant from a blood group...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208755

Matching with slot-specific priorities: theory

Kominers, Scott Duke; Sönmez, Tayfun - In: Theoretical Economics 11 (2016) 2, pp. 683-710

We introduce a two-sided, many-to-one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches … matching markets with slot-specific priorities, branches' choice functions may not satisfy the substitutability conditions … typically crucial for matching with contracts. Despite this complication, we are able to show that stable outcomes exist in the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599581